The effect of adult attachment on intrusive imagery by Yong, LCS
The effect of adult attachment on intrusive imagery 
 
Lawrence Yong 
 
D.Clin.Psy. thesis (Volume 1), 2016 
University College London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
UCL Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
Thesis declaration form 
 
 
 
I confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been 
derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.  
 
 
 
Signature:  
 
 
 
Name:  Lawrence Yong 
 
 
 
Date: 17/06/2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Overview 
 
This thesis is concerned with intrusive imagery within psychological disorders, 
and the study of this in relation to attachment theory. Part one is a narrative literature 
review of direct imagery interventions, such as imaginal exposure and imagery 
rescripting, for psychological disorders that are not post-traumatic stress disorder or 
acute stress disorder. This review serves as a reference guide for clinicians to help 
them navigate the literature on imagery interventions. Part two is an experimental 
study using a paired-associate methodology to investigate the association between 
attachment orientation and the experience of intrusive and involuntary imagery. This 
study elicits involuntary imagery within a laboratory context with members of the 
general population. Part three is a critical appraisal of the thesis process that reflects 
upon research processes with reference to the broader context of clinical psychology in 
general.  
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Abstract 
Aims 
To systematically review direct imagery interventions for psychological disorders that 
are not post-traumatic stress disorder or acute stress disorder. 
Method 
PsycINFO, MEDLINE, Web of Science and the Cochrane Library (including the Cochrane 
Central Register of Controlled Trials; CENTRAL) were searched for relevant studies. 
Studies were included if a standardised, validated quantitative outcome measure was 
used to evaluate a direct imagery-based psychological intervention for the treatment of 
a psychological disorder as classified by a recognised diagnostic classification system. 
Studies were excluded if they evaluated therapies comprising multiple components.   
Results 
Seventeen studies were reviewed, which evaluated four available interventions: 
imaginal exposure, imagery rescripting, emotive imagery and guided imagery, across a 
range of depressive, anxiety and psychotic disorders. Direct imagery interventions 
were shown to be effective in treating a range of disorders via several proposed 
mechanisms.  
Conclusions 
The literature demonstrating the effectiveness of direct imagery interventions are in 
their infancy. Studies have shown promising results across disorders and often on a 
single session basis. Further research is warranted to replicate some evaluations using 
larger sample sizes, longer follow-up periods and between-participants designs 
consisting of control groups. Use of such designs and specific outcome measures should 
be used to elucidate treatment mechanisms.  
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Introduction 
 
The relationship between mental imagery, emotion and psychological disorders 
Mental imagery occurs when perceptual information is experienced from 
memory, unlike perception where such information is registered directly from the 
senses (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). Mental images can take a more veridical 
form, consisting of accurately recalled past events and can also be made up of 
combined extracts or edited versions of stored perceptual information, much in the 
same way that Bartlett’s (1932) classic theory of reconstructive memory suggests. 
Research into the neural bases of mental imagery provides support for the concept of 
mental imagery as the re-experiencing of perceptual information. In a meta-analysis of 
57 neuroimaging studies, the majority reported activation of the early visual cortex in 
visual mental imagery studies (Thompson & Kosslyn, 2000). Motor imagery in the form 
of mental transformations has been shown to be correlated with activation of the 
motor cortices (Parsons et al., 1995). The ability of imagery to engage much of the same 
neural apparatus and processes involved in perception and movement may provide 
some explanation for the powerful effect of imagery on the body and mind and may 
affect individuals in a similar way to direct perceptual experience and action itself.  
The potent link between mental imagery and direct experience has been 
acknowledged and helpfully utilised across a variety of fields such as sports science 
(Feltz & Landers, 1983), medical surgery (Cocks, Moulton, Luu, & Cil, 2014) and 
physical therapy and rehabilitation (Dickstein et al., 2013). This has most often been in 
the form of voluntary mental imagery where images are brought to mind for a specific 
purpose, most often to practice in lieu of physical action/input to enhance 
performance, skills acquisition and perhaps also to maintain and heighten motivation.  
It has been suggested that mental imagery plays a prominent role in the 
representation of emotionally charged memory content (Kosslyn, 1994) and that 
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imagery and emotion have a “special relationship” (Holmes &  Matthews, 2005).  Mental 
imagery that occurs involuntarily is a transdiagnostic phenomenon that can be 
associated with negative emotional content, subjective distress and maintenance of 
psychological disorders. Involuntary mental imagery has predominantly been 
associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Holmes, Grey, & Young, 2005) 
and acute stress disorder (ASD). Indeed experiencing involuntary, intrusive images, 
nightmares and/or flashbacks are key diagnostic symptoms in both PTSD and ASD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). These two disorders can afflict those who 
have experienced a traumatic event, who subsequently experience involuntary images 
of these events. The symptoms of ASD and PTSD are similar, and are primarily 
differentiated based on the duration that sufferers experience symptoms rather than 
the symptoms themselves (Bryant, Matthew, Spiegel, Ursano, & Strain, 2010). There is 
also evidence to suggest there is a high level of diagnostic overlap between the two 
disorders (Brewin, Andrews, & Rose, 2003) and that ASD predicts the development of 
PTSD after trauma (Brewin, Andrews, Rose, & Kirk, 1999). While not regarded as a 
diagnostic criterion, the experience of negative involuntary mental imagery has been 
shown to be common to other disorders too (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010) 
such as social anxiety (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2005), depression (Patel et al., 
2007) and schizophrenia (D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008).  
 
Mental imagery interventions in clinical practice  
There is an ever broadening literature on how current knowledge of mental 
imagery can be utilised to inform treatment interventions for a variety of psychological 
disorders. Given the close association between intrusive mental imagery and ASD and 
PTSD, the existing research on psychological treatment interventions aimed at tackling 
negative imagery has tended to focus on studying post-traumatic symptoms, 
developing models to explain them (e.g. Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & 
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Clark, 2000) and subsequently testing treatments. These intervention techniques 
predominantly centre around re-experiencing negative imagery about past events, for 
example imaginal exposure (Keane, Fairbank, Caddell, & Zimmering, 1989) and may 
also involve manipulating these memories in some way “to provide corrective 
information” to alleviate distress as in imagery rescripting (Arntz, Kindt , & Tiesema, 
2007, p. 347). 
Holmes, Arntz, and Smucker (2007) make a heuristic distinction between 
“direct” and “indirect” imagery techniques within cognitive therapy, which aids 
navigation of the research literature. “Direct” techniques are concerned with the 
content of the image-based memory, in other words they are “imagery-interactive” 
techniques. The authors use a painting metaphor to explain this: “if the image was a 
painting, we would be working directly on the  interacting with the image itself in some 
way – such as, examining the picture, re-painting parts of it, and so on (Holmes et al., 
2007, p. 301).  
“Indirect” imagery techniques do not involve interacting with the image itself 
but are more concerned with “imagery-properties” so that “rather than painting 
directly on the canvas itself, we might choose to view the canvas (or the notion of 
painting!) in a different way” (Holmes et al., 2007, p.302). Mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy (Segal, Teasdale, & Williams, 2002) or meta-cognitive approaches (Wells, 
2000) encourage the distancing of oneself from the metaphorical canvas or ment al 
image and would be classed as “indirect” techniques.  
More recently there has been a development in techniques promoting the 
generation of images associated with positive content and emotions, for example the 
use of compassionate mind techniques (Gilbert & Irons, 2004; Lee, 2005). 
Compassionate mind techniques draw upon Buddhist healing practices (Salzberg, 
1995) and are focused on directing compassion towards the self, partly through 
generating images of places of safeness and images that represent compassionate 
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attributes such as warmth and sympathy. Techniques that address negative imagery as 
well as promote positive imagery may be classed as either direct or indirect within 
Holmes et al.’s (2007) framework.  
The role of mental imagery in the debilitating symptoms of several 
psychological disorders has been documented. There is extant literature investigating 
psychological interventions for ASD and PTSD, for example Ponniah and Hollon’s 
(2009) review, but the literature available on the effectiveness of using imagery-based 
intervention techniques, outside of the trauma-based ASD and PTSD literature, 
traditionally lags behind (Holmes et al., 2007).  
The relative paucity of studies published that demonstrate effectiveness of non-
trauma imagery intervention techniques may contribute to Bell, Mackie, and Bennett-
Levy’s (2015) reporting of cognitive-behavioural therapists’ apprehension and 
avoidance of using such techniques. Using interpretive phenomenological analysis 
(IPA), clinicians in their study noted that the “varied application” and “broad and fluid 
conception” of imagery were relevant factors which affected their use of imagery 
interventions. One therapist commented:  
Mainly I don’t know what I’m doing, that’s what causes the anxiety! Maybe not 
quite knowing whether I understand it fully as well, I suppose. When we talk 
about imagery, what’s meant by that? It’s just kind of I don’t know what I’m 
doing, I don’t know what it is! (Bell et al., 2015, p. 598) 
The therapists participating in this study nevertheless reported the importance 
of imagery for their clients and clinical practice and generally held a belief in the 
efficacy of image-focused interventions.  
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Present review 
 This literature review aims to provide an overview of evaluation studies for 
“direct” imagery-based interventions for psychological disorders, apart from the well-
covered PTSD and trauma literature. The questions guiding this review are:   
 
 Which direct imagery interventions have been used for disorders other than 
PTSD/ASD? 
 Are these interventions effective and for which disorders? 
 What are the proposed mechanisms behind these interventions?  
 What are the limitations of these studies and future directions for research into 
direct imagery interventions? 
  
One aim of this review is to provide an accessible source of current effective 
techniques, indexed by presenting problem, to aid clinicians who wish to utilise 
imagery-based techniques, but may feel unsure of which techniques are available. 
Indeed by providing a broad overview across disorders and interventions, emergent 
transdiagnostic themes will be highlighted. Brief descriptions of the imagery 
interventions identified will be given, in light of newly qualified therapists’ reporting of 
the varied application of imagery, apprehension about imagery work and the limited 
relevant core training they had received (Bell et al., 2015). With these aims in mind, an 
inclusive approach to study design would be relevant, such that single case studies and 
case series as well as larger between-subjects trials will be included in the current 
review. 
“Indirect” imagery techniques are beyond the scope of this review. This review will 
also focus on particular imagery-focused therapeutic interventions rather than whole 
“therapies”. A review of efficacy studies of whole therapies would not allow delineation 
of the individual contributions to effectiveness of specific imagery-based techniques. 
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Examples of multi-component therapies that include imagery-specific techniques 
within it, and thus would not be included in this review, are a range of cognitive -
behavioural therapy (CBT) protocols and Eye Movement Desensitisation and 
Reprocessing (EMDR) which consists of eight separate phases including history taking, 
desensitisation and body scanning (Shapiro & Solomon, 1995). Some attempt will be 
made to highlight notable studies evaluating therapies with an imagery component, in 
order to sign-post clinicians and as it would be remiss of a review to not acknowledge 
this significant aspect of the imagery literature.  In addition, a review delineating 
specific techniques may allow therapists to incorporate these techniques into their 
clinical practice more easily without having to change their preferred therapeutic 
modality altogether, in what has been termed “modular treatment” (Brewin et al., 
2009). Brewin et al. (2009) propose the utility of concept of modular treatment which 
allows for appropriate interventions to be targeted towards specific symptoms, given 
the heterogeneity and complexity of presentation of different disorders such as 
depression (Fava, Ruini, & Belaise, 2007; Goldberg, 2011) and schizophrenia 
(Carpenter Jr. & Kirkpatrick. 1988).  
 
Method 
Electronic searches 
The electronic databases PsycINFO, MEDLINE, Web of Science and the Cochrane 
Library (including the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials; CENTRAL) were 
searched with the following key words to identify relevant articles:  (imagery OR 
imagery(psychotherapy) OR imagination OR imaginal) AND (intervention OR 
therapeutics OR therapy OR therap* OR treatment OR treat*) AND (mental disorder* 
OR mental disorders). The databases were searched from the first available date to 1 st 
April 2016.  
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Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Articles were included in this review if: 
1. they were published in the English language; 
2. they were published in a peer-reviewed journal; 
3. they described studies in which the effectiveness of direct imagery-based 
psychological interventions/techniques were evaluated, and not therapies 
consisting of multiple components; 
4. a standardised, validated outcome measure was used to evaluate the 
intervention; 
5. the sample was assessed to have a diagnosis of a psychological disorder as 
defined by a diagnostic classification system such as DSM-5 (Diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders (5 th ed.); American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) or ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases, 10 th 
Revision; World Health Organisation, 1992) but not of PTSD or ASD.  
 
The database search returned 2759 unique hits. References were at first screened 
by title for potential relevance, with those identified subsequently screened by abstract. 
If an abstract appeared relevant the full article was read by the reviewer to ascertain 
whether inclusion criteria were met. A large number of references were discarded at 
the first stage as they did not relate to imagery-based interventions, but, for example, to 
neuroimaging studies or studies investigating phenomenology of imagery in 
participants. 2527 articles were discarded for failing to meet inclusion criteria 1 to 4. 
215 articles were discarded as they related to samples with PTSD or ASD (criterion 5). 
Thus 17 articles were included in the final review. The selection process used is 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Some notable studies were excluded for meeting some inclusion criteria but not 
others. Evaluation studies such as those by Wild, Hackmann, and Clark (2007; 2008) 
met all inclusion criteria except criterion 3, as they included multiple therapeutic 
components in their treatment, in this case imagery rescripting with the addition of 
verbal cognitive restructuring. Several studies were identified as meeting criteria 1 to 
3, but not 4 and/or 5. Pajak and Kamboj’s (2014) study, for example, investigates the 
use of imagery rescripting in bladder/bowel control anxiety as part of anxiety 
disorders such as social anxiety disorder, but the intervention was evaluated by 
participants’ subjective ratings of distress (SUDS; Wolpe, 1958) only and not a 
standardised outcome measure and thus did not meet inclusion criterion 4. Studies that 
only used SUDS as an outcome measure were deemed to not meet criterion 4, due to 
concerns that SUDS may lack validity and reliability as an outcome measure (Debell & 
Jones, 1997; Lohr et al., 1992), despite being a useful tool for clinicians in practice.  The 
Potentially relevant references 
identified and screened for 
retrieval (N=2759) 
References excluded that used 
a sample diagnosed with 
PTSD/ASD (N=215) 
 
References excluded that did 
not address effectiveness of 
direct imagery-based 
interventions, use a sample 
with a formal diagnosis or use 
a standardised validated 
outcome measure (N= 2527) 
 References meeting all 
inclusion criteria (N=17) 
 
Figure 1 
Electronic database search flow chart 
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decision to exclude studies using SUDS, in order to preserve confidence in the validity 
and reliability of outcome measures used, was weighed against the inevitable exclusion 
of earlier studies published before 1990s and the development of many standardised 
measures.  
SUDS were often found to be utilised in conjunction with the Behavioural 
Avoidance Test (BAT), an analogue test situation. BATS have b een accused of being 
susceptible to demand characteristics (Gliksman & Winkler, 1980) and substantial 
variability in BAT methodology used (Steketee, Chambless, Tran, Worden, & Gillis, 
1996) and thus studies using BATS to evaluate interventions, in the abse nce of other 
validated measures, were not included in this review. Inclusion criterion 4, relating to 
use of standardised and validated outcome measures only, increases the likelihood that 
the measures chosen were relevant for the target population, rather  than generic 
subjective measures such as SUDS. This serves to ensure the inclusion of higher quality 
studies to allow clinicians to be able to make more informed decisions about employing 
imagery interventions.  
Several studies were also excluded as participants were not noted to have had a 
formal diagnosis and thus did not meet criterion 5. These studies often recruited 
participants from student populations or advertisements who only self-identified as 
being particularly high in a certain trait for example anxiety or anger (e.g. Hecker, 
1990).  
 
Quality assessment of included studies 
One of the aims of the current review is to provide an overview of current 
research on direct imagery interventions, to help inform clinicians about what 
techniques may be available and for which client groups and diagnoses. In addition, in 
order to help direct future research needs, an assessment of study quality is important. 
Study quality is linked to the strength of conclusions that can be drawn about 
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effectiveness studies and is thus relevant for scientist-practitioner clinicians who are 
inevitably interested in what techniques work for their clients. The authors assessed 
the included studies using Standard Quality Assessment Criteria for Evaluating Primary 
Research Papers from a Variety of Fields (Kmet, Lee, & Cook, 2004). This checklist was 
developed for the evaluation for a variety of types of quantitative studies, not j ust 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs), which matches the wider search approach of this 
review.  
The included studies were rated according to the degree that each of 14 criteria 
were met (“yes” = 2, “partial” = 1, “no” = 0). Checklist items not applicable  to a 
particular study design were marked “n/a” and not included in the calculation of the 
summary score. A summary score was calculated for each paper by summing the total 
score obtained across relevant items and dividing by the total possible score. Tabl e 1 
shows the quality assessment of the included 17 studies.  
 
 
21 
 
Table 1  
Quality assessment of included studies 
Quality assessment criteria 
Study 
Brewin et al. 
(2009) 
Chambless et 
al. (1982) 
Clum et al. 
(1993) 
Cornwall et 
al. (1996) 
Esplen et al. 
(1998) 
Foa et al. 
(1985) 
Question / objective sufficiently described? 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Study design evident and appropriate? 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Method of participant/comparison group selection or source of 
information/input variables described and appropriate? 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Participant (and comparison group, if applicable) characteristics 
sufficiently described? 2 1 2 1 2 2 
If interventional and random allocation was possible, was it 
described? N/A 1 0 1 2 0 
If interventional and blinding of investigators was possible, was it 
reported? N/A 0 0 0 1 0 
If interventional and blinding of participants was possible, was it 
reported? N/A 0 0 0 0 0 
Outcome and (if applicable) exposure measure(s) well defined and 
robust to measurement / misclassification bias? Means of 
assessment reported? 2 1 2 2 2 1 
Sample size appropriate? 2 1 1 1 2 1 
Analytic methods described/justified and appropriate? 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Some estimate of variance is reported for the main results? 2 0 1 2 2 2 
Controlled for confounding? 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Results reported in sufficient detail? 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Conclusions supported by the results? 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Total score 21 17 18 20 25 18 
Possible maximum score 22 28 28 28 28 28 
Summary score 0.95 0.61 0.64 0.71 0.89 0.64 
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Quality assessment criteria 
Study 
Fracalanza et 
al. (2014) 
Frets et al. 
(2014) 
Ison et al. 
(2014) 
Levinson et al. 
(2014) 
Nilsson et al. 
(2012) 
Question / objective sufficiently described? 2 2 2 2 2 
Study design evident and appropriate? 2 2 2 2 2 
Method of participant/comparison group selection or source of 
information/input variables described and appropriate? 2 2 2 1 2 
participant (and comparison group, if applicable) characteristics 
sufficiently described? 2 2 2 1 2 
If interventional and random allocation was possible, was it described? 0 N/A N/A N/A 2 
If interventional and blinding of investigators was possible, was it 
reported? 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
If interventional and blinding of participants was possible, was it reported? 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
Outcome and (if applicable) exposure measure(s) well defined and robust 
to measurement / misclassification bias? Means of assessment reported? 2 2 2 1 2 
Sample size appropriate? 2 1 1 2 1 
Analytic methods described/justified and appropriate? 2 1 1 2 2 
Some estimate of variance is reported for the main results? 2 0 1 1 2 
Controlled for confounding? 2 1 1 0 2 
Results reported in sufficient detail? 2 2 1 2 2 
Conclusions supported by the results? 2 2 2 2 2 
Total score 22 17 17 15 23 
Possible maximum score 28 22 22 20 28 
Summary score 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.82 
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Quality assessment criteria 
Study 
Reimer & 
Moscovitch 
(2015) 
Rus-Calafell 
et al. (2013) 
Veale et al. 
(2015) 
Watson & 
Marks, 
(1971) 
Wheatley et 
al. (2007) 
Whitaker et 
al. (2010) 
Question / objective sufficiently described? 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Study design evident and appropriate? 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Method of participant/comparison group selection or source of 
information/input variables described and appropriate? 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Participant (and comparison group, if applicable) characteristics 
sufficiently described? 2 2 2 2 2 2 
If interventional and random allocation was possible, was it 
described? 0 1 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
If interventional and blinding of investigators was possible, was it 
reported? 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
If interventional and blinding of participants was possible, was it 
reported? 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
Outcome and (if applicable) exposure measure(s) well defined and 
robust to measurement / misclassification bias? Means of 
assessment reported? 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Sample size appropriate? 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Analytic methods described/justified and appropriate? 2 2 2 0 2 2 
Some estimate of variance is reported for the main results? 2 2 2 0 N/A N/A 
Controlled for confounding? 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Results reported in sufficient detail? 2 2 2 0 2 1 
Conclusions supported by the results? 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Total score 20 22 22 13 19 17 
Possible maximum score 28 28 22 28 20 20 
Summary score 0.71 0.79 1.00 0.46 0.95 0.85 
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Results 
Study characteristics 
The 17 identified studies are presented in Tables 2 to 9, subdivided by 
diagnosis. Each table includes study characteristics, including study design and results.  
 
Quality assessment 
Watson and Marks’s (1971) study was scored as lowest according to the quality 
checklist, with a summary score of 0.46 or 46%. The highest scoring was Veale et al. 
(2015) with a score of 1 or 100%. The most notable design weaknesses, highlighted by 
item scores of 0, related to blinding of investigators and participants. Only one study 
reported blinding of investigators (Esplen et al., 1998), and no studies reporting 
blinding of participants out of 10 studies where this was possible. It is interesting to 
note that the five lowest scoring studies are the five oldest. This is highlighted by a 
significant positive correlation between year of publication and quality checklist 
summary score, r=.72, p=.001. Methodological quality gains of this type over time have 
been demonstrated in psychopharmacology trials (Brunoni, Tadini, & Fregni, 2010) 
and may also be the case in psychological therapy evaluation trials, as demonstrated 
here. 
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Table 2 
Study characteristics and results of studies investigating depressive disorders 
Study N 
Diagnosis of 
sample 
Direct imagery 
intervention 
Intervention 
length Design 
Control 
Group? Measurement timings 
Main dependent measures 
and treatment effects 
Brewin et al. 
(2009) 
10 Major 
Depressive 
Disorder 
(adults) 
Imagery 
Rescripting 
As per clinical 
need, mean = 
8.1 weekly 
sessions (1 
hour each)  
Case 
series 
- Pre-treatment baseline 
(3 weeks); During 
treatment (weekly); 
Follow-up (3, 6, 9, 12 
months) 
BDI: +; 6 of 10 participants 
showed clinically significant 
improvement  
 
Intrusive memory composite 
ratings:  + 
 
Rumination composite 
ratings: +  
Wheatley et al. 
(2007) 
2 Major 
Depressive 
Episode (adult 
male) 
Imagery 
rescripting 
As per clinical 
need, mean = 
11 weekly 
sessions 
Case 
study 
- Pre-treatment baseline 
(3 weeks); During 
treatment (weekly); 
Follow-up (3, 6, 9, 12 
months) 
BDI: 2 of 2 participants 
showed clinically significant 
improvement 
 
Intrusive memory composite 
ratings: self-rated 
improvement 
Whitaker et al. 
(2010) 
1 Major 
Depressive 
Episode and 
GAD (in the 
context of 
cancer)(adult 
male) 
Imagery 
rescripting 
7 weekly 
sessions (1 
hour each) 
Case 
study 
- Pre-treatment baseline 
(3 weeks); During 
treatment (weekly); 
Follow-up (3, 6 
months) 
HADS: clinically significant 
improvement 
 
Intrusive symptoms ratings: 
self-rated improvement 
Note + = statistically significant improvement; - = statistically significant worsening; +/- no statistical change. 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
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Table 3 
Study characteristics and results of studies investigating panic disorder and agoraphobia  
Study N 
Diagnosis of 
sample 
Direct 
imagery 
intervention Intervention length Design Control Group? 
Measurement 
timings 
Main dependent measures and 
treatment effects 
Chambless 
et al. 
(1982) 
21 Agoraphobia 
(adults) 
Imaginal 
Exposure 
8 sessions (2 hours 
each) over 4 weeks 
RCT 
(crossover) 
Flooding under 
sedation and 
attention 
control 
Pre-; Post- AVS avoidance: +, imaginal 
exposure>controls 
 
AVS fear: +, imaginal 
exposure>attentional control, 
imaginal exposure=flooding under 
sedation 
 
AVS panic: +, imaginal 
exposure=controls  
 
AVS anxiety: +/-, imaginal 
exposure=controls 
Clum et al. 
(1993) 
24 Panic 
Disorder 
(adults) 
Imaginal 
Exposure 
6 individual 
sessions (1 hour 
each) + 4 group 
sessions (1.5 hours 
each) over 6 weeks 
Quasi-
experimental 
Guided 
imaginal 
coping and 
wait list 
control 
Pre-; Post-; 
Follow-up (4 
months) 
PASQ: +/- (trend improvement, 
p<.10),  
 
PACQ: +/- (trend improvement, 
p<.10) 
 
 
Note + = statistically significant improvement post-treatment compared to pre-treatment; - = statistically significant worsening post- compared to pre-treatment; 
+/- = no statistical change between pre- and post-treatment; > = statistically significant difference in the direction indicated, < = statistically significant difference in 
the direction indicated, = = no statistical difference 
 
AVS = Anxiety and Avoidance Scale; PASQ = Panic Attack Symptoms Questionnaire; PACQ = Panic Attack Cognitions Questionnaire  
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Table 4 
Study characteristics and results of studies investigating specific phobias 
Study N 
Diagnosis of 
sample 
Direct imagery 
intervention 
Intervention 
length Design 
Control 
Group? 
Measurement 
timings Main dependent measures and treatment effects 
Cornwall 
et al. 
(1996) 
24 Specific Phobia 
- darkness 
(children 7-10 
years) 
Emotive 
Imagery 
6 weekly 
sessions (1 hour 
each) 
RCT Wait list 
control 
Pre-; Post-; 
Follow-up (3 
months) 
FSSC-R: emotive imagery>control 
 
RCMAS: emotive imagery>control 
 
Darkness Fear Behaviour Questionnaire: emotive 
imagery>control 
 
Darkness Tolerance Test: emotive 
imagery>control 
Rus-
Calafell et 
al. (2013) 
 
15 Specific Phobia 
- flying  
(adults) 
 
Imaginal 
Exposure 
 
6 sessions (1.25 
hours each) over 
3 weeks 
 
RCT Virtual 
reality 
exposure 
 
Pre-; Post-; 
Post real 
flight (within 
2 weeks); 
Follow-up (6 
months) 
 
FFQ: +, imaginal exposure=virtual reality exposure 
 
FFS: +, imaginal exposure=virtual reality exposure 
 
DEFAS: +, imaginal exposure=virtual reality 
exposure 
 
ADIS-IV fear and avoidance: + 
 
LIS severity: + 
Watson & 
Marks 
(1971) 
16 Specific Phobia 
– varied 
(adults) 
Imaginal 
Exposure 
8 sessions (1 
hour each) 
Crossover - Pre-; Post- 
 
AVS: + 
Note + = statistically significant improvement post-treatment compared to pre-treatment; - = statistically significant worsening post- compared to pre-treatment; 
+/- = no statistical change between pre- and post-treatment; > = statistically significant difference in the direction indicated, < = statistically significant difference in 
the direction indicated, = = no statistical difference 
 
FSSC-R = Fear Survey Schedule for Children – Revised; RCMAS = Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale; FFQ = Fear of Flying Questionnaire; FFS = Fear of Flying 
Scale; DEFAS = Danger Expectations and Flying Anxiety Scales; ADIS-IV = Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV; LIS = Life Interference Scale; AVS = 
Anxiety and Avoidance Scale 
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Table 5 
Study characteristics and results of studies investigating social anxiety disorder 
Study N 
Diagnosis 
of sample 
Direct 
imagery 
intervention 
Intervention 
length Design 
Control 
Group? 
Measurement 
timings 
Main dependent measures and treatment 
effects 
Frets et al. 
(2014) 
6 Social 
Anxiety 
Disorder 
(adults) 
Imagery 
rescripting 
Until satisfied 
with results, 
mean = 11.2 
weekly 
sessions (45 
minutes each) 
Case series Each 
participant 
as own 
control (no 
treatment 
baseline) 
Pre-treatment 
baseline; 
During 
treatment 
(weekly); Post-
treatment; 
Follow-up (3, 6 
months) 
SIAS: all participants improved post-
treatment 
 
SPS: all participants improved post-
treatment 
 
AVS: all participants improved post-
treatment 
 
SPAI-N: all participants improved post-
treatment, range 12-85% improvement 
 
BFNE: all participants improved post-
treatment, range 17-65% improvement 
Nilsson et 
al. (2012) 
14 Social 
Anxiety 
Disorder 
(adults) 
Imagery 
rescripting 
One session RCT Reading 
task 
Pre-; Post- (1 
week) 
SIAS:  imagery rescripting>control 
 
FNE: imagery rescripting>control 
 
Distress ratings: imagery 
rescripting>control 
 
Meaning of image: imagery 
rescripting>control 
Reimer & 
Moscovitch 
(2015) 
25 Social 
Anxiety 
Disorder 
(adults) 
Imagery 
rescripting 
One session 
(1.5 hours) 
Quasi-
experimental 
Wait list 
control 
Pre-; Post- (1 
week) 
SPIN: +, imagery rescripting>control 
 
LSAS: +, +, imagery rescripting>control 
 
Perceived validity and accuracy of negative 
appraisals: +, imagery rescripting>control 
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Emotions associated with memories: +, 
imagery rescripting>control 
Note + = statistically significant improvement post-treatment compared to pre-treatment; - = statistically significant worsening post- compared to pre-treatment; 
+/- = no statistical change between pre- and post-treatment; > = statistically significant difference in the direction indicated, < = statistically significant difference in 
the direction indicated, = = no statistical difference 
 
SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; SPS = Social Phobia Scale; AVS = Anxiety and Avoidance Scale; SPAI-N = Dutch Social Phobia Anxiety Inventory; BFNE = Brief 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; SPIN – Social Phobia Inventory; LSAS – Leibowitz Social Anxiety Scale; 
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Table 6 
Study characteristics and results of the study investigating generalised anxiety disorder 
 
Study N 
Diagnosis of 
sample 
Direct imagery 
intervention 
Intervention 
length Design Control Group? 
Measurement 
timings 
Main dependent 
measures and 
treatment effects 
Fracalanza 
et al. 
(2014) 
57 GAD (adults) Imaginal 
Exposure 
(written - 
consistent 
exposure) 
Writing on 3 
consecutive days 
(20 minutes each) 
RCT Varied written 
exposure and 
neutral writing 
control 
Pre-treatment 
baseline; Post- (1 
week) 
PSWQ: +, consistent 
exposure>controls 
 
WAQ: +, consistent 
exposure>varied 
exposure 
 
CAQ: +/-, consistent 
exposure=controls 
 
IUS: +, consistent 
exposure>controls  
Note + = statistically significant improvement post-treatment compared to pre-treatment; - = statistically significant worsening post- compared to pre-treatment; 
+/- = no statistical change between pre- and post-treatment; > = statistically significant difference in the direction indicated, < = statistically significant difference in 
the direction indicated, = = no statistical difference 
 
PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire; CAQ = Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire; IUS =  Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale 
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Table 7 
Study characteristics and results of studies investigating obsessive compulsive disorder 
 
Study N 
Diagnosis of 
sample 
Direct imagery 
intervention 
Intervention 
length Design Control Group? 
Measurement 
timings 
Main dependent 
measures and 
treatment effects 
Foa et al. 
(1985) 
19 OCD (adults) Imaginal 
Exposure 
15 daily sessions 
(2 hours each) + 2 
sessions at home 
(4 hours each) 
over a 3 week 
period  
RCT In vivo exposure Pre-; Post- (3 days); 
Follow-up (3, 6, 12, 
18 months) 
MOCI: +, imaginal 
exposure=in vivo 
exposure 
Veale et al. 
(2015) 
12 OCD (adults) Imagery 
rescripting 
One session Case series Each participant 
as own control 
(discussion of 
imagery only) 
Intake; Post 
control/Pre-
treatment baseline; 
Post-; Follow-up (3 
months) 
Y-BOCS: 8 of 12 +, 5 
of 12 participants 
showed clinically 
significant 
improvement, 
imagery 
rescripting>control 
 
OCI: mean 
improvement 
 
RIQ: mean 
improvement 
Note + = statistically significant improvement post-treatment compared to pre-treatment; - = statistically significant worsening post- compared to pre-treatment; 
+/- = no statistical change between pre- and post-treatment; > = statistically significant difference in the direction indicated, < = statistically significant difference in 
the direction indicated, = = no statistical difference 
 
MOCI = Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory; Y-BOCS = Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale; OCI = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory; RIQ = Responsibility 
Interpretations Questionnaire 
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Table 8 
Study characteristics and results of studies investigating eating disorders 
 
Study N 
Diagnosis of 
sample 
Direct imagery 
intervention 
Intervention 
length Design Control Group? 
Measurement 
timings 
Main dependent measures and 
treatment effects 
Esplen et 
al. (1998) 
50 Bulimia 
Nervosa 
(adults) 
Guided Imagery 6 weekly sessions 
(1 hour each) + 
daily homework 
practice 
RCT Weekly 
sessions 
discussing 
diary 
monitoring of 
eating 
behaviour  
Pre-; Post- (1 
week) 
EDI: +, guided imagery>control, 56% 
clinically significant improvement after 
guided imagery compared to <10% 
post-control 
 
EAT-26: +, guided imagery>control 
 
Binging/purging (self-report): +, 
guided imagery>control, 25% 
symptom free after guided imagery 
compared to 0% post-control 
 
Soothing Receptivity Scale: +, guided 
imagery>control 
Levinson 
et al. 
(2014) 
1 Anorexia 
Nervosa  
(adult 
female) 
Imaginal Exposure 12 sessions 3-7 
days apart over 28 
days 
Case 
study 
- Pre-; Post-; 
Follow-up (1 
month) 
EDE-Q: +, 95% certainty of clinically 
significant improvement   
 
CIA: +, 95% certainty of clinically 
significant improvement 
 
BMI: 1.72 BMI increase  
Note + = statistically significant improvement post-treatment compared to pre-treatment; - = statistically significant worsening post- compared to pre-treatment; 
+/- = no statistical change between pre- and post-treatment; > = statistically significant difference in the direction indicated, < = statistically significant difference in 
the direction indicated, = = no statistical difference 
 
EDI = Eating Disorder Inventory; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test; EDE-Q = Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire; CIA = Clinical Impairment Assessment; BMI 
= Body Mass Index; 
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Table 9 
Study characteristics and results of the study investigating schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders 
 
Study N 
Diagnosis of 
sample 
Direct imagery 
intervention 
Intervention 
length Design 
Control 
Group? Measurement timings 
Main dependent measures 
and treatment effects 
Ison et al. 
(2014) 
4 Schizophrenia/ 
Schizoaffective 
Disorder  
(adults) 
Imagery 
rescripting 
1 session 
(1.5 hours) 
Case series - Pre-treatment baseline; Post-; 
Follow-up (1,  4 weeks) 
PSYRATS - Auditory 
Hallucinations/Delusions: +/- 
 
Voice Power Differential Scale: 
+/- 
 
DASS: +/-  
 
Imagery frequency, 
uncontrollability, distress, 
negative affect ratings: 3 of 4 
participants showed 
improvements 
Note + = statistically significant improvement post-treatment compared to pre-treatment; - = statistically significant worsening post- compared to pre-treatment; 
+/- = no statistical change between pre- and post-treatment; > = statistically significant difference in the direction indicated, < = statistically significant difference in 
the direction indicated, = = no statistical difference 
 
PSYRATS = Psychotic Symptoms Ratings Scales; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 
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Direct imagery interventions 
Four types of direct imagery interventions were evaluated in the 17 studies 
identified: imaginal exposure, imagery rescripting, guided imagery and emotive 
imagery. Each of these interventions is briefly described below, followed by a review of 
their effectiveness by disorder.  
 
Imaginal Exposure. Exposure to a feared stimulus is a core treatment for 
anxiety and phobia related disorders. It can take a hierarchical form whereby 
individuals are progressively exposed to more anxiety-provoking stimuli over the 
course of treatment, or a more prolonged form (flooding) whereby the individual is 
exposed to their feared situation with the aim of experiencing their anxiety until it 
becomes tolerable. It is thought that exposure to a feared stimulus may reduce anxiety 
via habituation whereby there is a decremental neuronal response to repeated 
stimulation (Groves & Thompson, 1970). Foa and Kozak’s (1986) emotional processing 
theory (EPT)  combines habituation with corrective learning, whereby memory 
structures that hold information about the meaning of and responses to fear (‘fear 
structures’) are modified via the introduction of new information. This emotional 
processing is not necessarily conscious and with that in mind, exposure therapy is 
usually classed as an intervention derived from behavioural rather than cognitive 
theory. 
Exposure to an actual feared stimulus (in vivo exposure) is not always feasible, 
if the feared stimulus is too costly or inconvenient to incorporate into treatment or is a 
past/hypothetical future event as is commonly the case in PTSD and GAD (generalised 
anxiety disorder) respectively. Imaginal exposure is an alternative that uses mental 
images of feared stimuli.  
 Seven studies evaluating imaginal exposure were found in the literature, 
spanning several anxiety disorders and anorexia nervosa. All of the studies evaluated 
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imaginal exposure delivered verbally with a therapist, except Frazalanza et al (2014) 
who used a written variant.  
 
Imagery rescripting. Imagery rescripting (Smucker, Dancu, Foa, & Niederee, 
1995) was the most common intervention to be evaluated, accounting for 8 of the 17 
identified studies, spanning depression, social anxiety disorder, OCD and 
schizophrenia. It involves individuals holding intrusive and distressing mental images 
in mind, and vividly imagining alternative, more positive outcomes.  A common 
procedure involves a three-stage rescripting (Arntz & Weertman, 1999). The first stage 
(reliving) involves the individual imagining the event in their mind,  at the age they 
were when it occurred. This stage is arguably similar to imaginal exposure, except that 
the client is more active in producing a spoken account of their imagery, rather than 
listening to the therapist’s voice of a script as is often the case during imaginal 
exposure. The second stage (exposure mastery) involves mentally reliving the event 
but this time observing from the perspective of their current self, at their current age. 
They would subsequently intervene in a disarming and often compassionate manner 
and convey to their younger self an alternative message or meaning of the situation. 
Thirdly (compassion/nurturing), individuals relive the second stage but from the 
perspective of their younger self, experiencing their present self intervening again, able 
to request and do what they need to, to feel safe in that situation.  
There is notable variability in use of compassion within the third rescripting 
stage. Some use Arntz and Weertman’s (1999) protocol but do not mention feelings of 
compassion and instead place more emphasis on imagining the content of imagery 
changing (Veale et al., 2015).  
 
Emotive imagery. Emotive imagery is a variant of systematic desensitisation 
(Wolpe, 1969). Systematic desensitisation may be conceptualised as the gradual 
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habituation to a feared stimulus through the generation of anxiety-inhibiting responses 
(Wolpe, 1969). These anxiety-inhibiting responses take the form of relaxation as well 
as emotions other than fear such as anger. Emotive imagery has been app lied to 
children, with imagination used to generate positive and anxiety-inhibiting emotions, 
such as self-assertion, pride or affection (Lazarus & Abramovitz, 1962). Only one 
evaluation study was identified that met all criteria, a randomized controlled t rial of 
emotive imagery for the treatment of darkness phobia in children (Cornwall et al., 
1996). 
 
Guided imagery. Guided imagery is an intervention that involves the 
generation of positive images, rather than addressing existing negative imagery. It has 
been widely written about in various fields, including hypnotherapy and music therapy, 
as well as psychological therapy. Fifty-seven articles were identified as relating to 
guided imagery but were excluded from the present review at an early stage as that 
were not published in the field of psychology and not understood within frameworks 
based on psychological theory. These articles were not necessarily evaluations of 
guided imagery as an intervention and no guided imagery studies were identified that 
satisfied the inclusion and exclusion criteria of the present review but were not in the 
field of psychology. Guided imagery protocols may vary with some used in conjunction 
with other treatment components such as Apóstolo and Kolcaba’s (2009) investigation 
of guided imagery as a treatment for depressive disorders within psychiatric inpatients 
that combined guided imagery with progressive muscle relaxation. Studies using 
multicomponent protocols such as this were not included in this review. The only 
reference identified that met all inclusion criteria and evaluated ‘pure’ guided imagery 
was Esplen et al.’s (1998) randomised controlled trial in bulimia nervosa.  
 
 
37 
 
Direct imagery interventions by disorder 
In line with the aims of this review, the 17 identified studies have been 
classified by groups of disorders for ease of reference. Details of reported effectiveness 
and detail about what different interventions entailed are provided, so as to allow 
readers to contrast therapeutic methods, both between studies reported and with their 
own clinical practice. The authors’ purported mechanisms of change are also 
highlighted. An overarching discussion in relation to active mechanisms is included in 
the Discussion section.  
 
Direct imagery interventions for depressive disorders 
 Three studies were identified that tested the effectiveness of direct imagery 
interventions for depressive disorders in adults. These three studies evaluated imagery 
rescripting (Wheatley et al., 2007; Brewin et al., 2009; Whitaker et al., 2010).  
These studies make the case that imagery interventions may be particularly 
useful in treating depression due to the high occurrence of distressing intrusive 
memories, with estimates varying between 44% (Patel et al., 2007) and 87% (Brewin, 
Hunter, Carroll, & Tata, 1996) in those suffering from depression. Greater levels of 
intrusion and avoidance of intrusive autobiographical memories are associated with 
greater depression severity and lower self-esteem (Kuyken & Brewin, 1994; 1999).  
 
Effectiveness. Brewin et al. (2009) performed a case series of 10 clients 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder who received imagery rescripting and 
Wheatley et al. (2007) present a more detailed case study of two of the clients included 
in the series. Clients received as many hourly sessions of imagery rescripting based on 
manuals derived from Arntz and Weertman, (1999), Smucker et al. (2005) and 
Hackmann (1998), as was necessary according to clinical need, with more sessions 
offered if additional intrusive memories were reported. Post-treatment and at 12 
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month follow-up, measures of depression and measures of intrusive memories and 
rumination showed significant mean improvements. These gains were maintained after 
12 months, and overall demonstrate that imagery rescripting has the potential to be an 
effective standalone intervention for depressed individuals.  
Imagery rescripting has also been evaluated for depression and GAD in the 
context of cancer (Whitaker et al., 2010). Whitaker et al. (2010) used a three stage 
rescripting protocol that included notable variations such as imagining the comical 
humiliation of a bullying boss from work as a clown (mastery), and using 
compassionate imagery of a perfect nurturer, in this case an understanding and 
forgiving angel (Gilbert  & Irons, 2004; Lee, 2005). The client’s level of depression and 
anxiety had improved post-treatment and continued at six month follow-up. The client 
also reported decreased frequency, distress, and interference of the intrusive 
memories. Furthermore, he reported a generalisation of the use of the compassionate, 
perfect nurturer image between post-treatment and follow up, such that he would 
bring forth this image in times of stress.  
It is notable that imaginal exposure has also been successfully employed as an 
imagery intervention to treat depression in a single case study (Kandris & Moulds, 
2008). This study is not included in this review as the client was not formally assessed 
as having a diagnosis of a depressive disorder and thus did not meet inclusion criterion 
5.  
 
Proposed mechanisms. The retrieval competition hypothesis (Brewin, 2006) 
has informed Brewin et al. (2009) and Wheatley et al. (2007)’s evaluations of imagery 
rescripting for adults with depression.  This concept emphasises the competition 
between various (positive and negative) memory representations that directly affect 
mood and behaviour. Brewin et al. (2009) and Wheatley et al. (2007) argue that 
imagery rescripting may incorporate new positive information to image, creating new 
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and more readily accessible images than the dominant negative memory 
representations in those who suffer from depression. EPT (Foa & Kozak, 1986) was 
used as the explanatory framework for imaginal exposure in depression (Kandris & 
Moulds, 2008).   
 Brewin et al. (2009) and Wheatley (2007) attempted to ensure that their 
imagery rescripting interventions did not include explicit verbal cognitive 
restructuring. Nevertheless, they elicited the meaning of clients’ intrusions and 
appraisal ratings were taken before and after each rescripting. It cannot be discounted 
that clients may have been primed to engage in incidental cognitive restructuring of 
their own accord. Alternatively an implicit, unconscious form of restructuring may have 
taken place, which Wheatley (2007, p.378) names “spontaneous restructuring”, which 
may also account for some of the findings.  
In addition the reduction of self-criticism as a result of compassionate mind 
imagery (Gilbert & Irons, 2004; Lee, 2005) was another possible mechanism in 
Whitaker et al.’s (2010) study. 
 
Direct imagery interventions for anxiety and obsessive-compulsive related 
disorders  
Eleven studies were identified that tested the effectiveness of direct imagery 
techniques for anxiety and obsessive-compulsive related disorders, which represents 
the group of disorders in which these interventions have been utilised most.  
 
Panic disorder and agoraphobia. Panic disorder and agoraphobia are closely 
linked, with approximately a fifth of those who have experienced panic disorder in their 
lifetime having also suffered from agoraphobia (Kessler et al., 2006). In vivo 
exposure/flooding has traditionally been a treatment for these disorders (Marks, 
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Boulougouris, & Marset, 1972) and studies have evaluated the possibility of using 
imaginal exposure too.  
 
Effectiveness. Two studies were found that utilised imaginal exposure to treat 
panic disorder (Clum et al., 1993) or agoraphobia (Chambless et al., 1982). Several 
other notable studies were identified that investigated imaginal exposure but were not 
included in the final review due to failure to meet inclusion criteria as interventions 
were combined without the effects of each included as separate evaluations (e.g. Marks 
et al., 1972; Gelder at al., 1973). 
Chambless et al. (1982) conducted a randomised multiphase crossover study 
comparing imaginal flooding with flooding in conjunction with a short -acting 
barbiturate sedative, as well as against an attentional control, for the treatment of 
agoraphobia. Hierarchical imagined flooding focused on phobic situations, and the 
hypothetical disastrous feared consequences of panicking. The imaginal flooding group 
(non-drug) showed significant reductions in post-treatment fear and avoidance, 
compared to the drug flooding and control groups, as measured by Watson and Marks’ 
(1971) anxiety and avoidance rating scales (AVS). The second phase of the study 
included in vivo exposure components, which allowed for comparison between 
imaginal and in vivo flooding after controlling for covariance. It was found that 
imaginal exposure was as effective as the in vivo procedure.  
In contrast, Clum et al. (1993) found that imaginal exposure was not 
statistically better than the wait-list control in the treatment of panic disorder and 
panic disorder with agoraphobia, with neither of these groups showing a statistically 
significant improvement. They were comparing imaginal exposure with guided 
imaginal coping, a multicomponent imagery therapy, of which imaginal exposure is one 
aspect. 
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Proposed mechanisms. Habituation has been proposed as the active 
mechanism for imaginal exposure for panic disorder and agoraphobia by Chambless et 
al. (1982). They included a drug flooding group to ascertain whether subjective anxiety 
(supposedly counteracted by the sedative in this group) was necessary for habituation. 
The sedative drug did not reduce subjective anxiety as expected. This group showed 
the same amount of within session habituation as the non-drug flooding group but less 
across session habituation. The authors do not suggest why the drug might affect 
across session habituation but, they note a possible expectancy effect across sessions. 
They suggest that, based on feedback from previous sessions, clients may approach 
subsequent exposure sessions with expectations of increased or decreased fear 
responses to phobic situations. Expecting to be scared may mean that they were less 
likely to habituate. This proposed mechanism thus combines a behavioural explanation 
of habituation with cognitive appraisal processes.  
 
Specific phobias. Imaginal exposure was the imagery intervention used in the 
literature for treating specific phobias in adults (Watson & Marks, 1971; Rus-Calafell et 
al., 2013) and emotive imagery for children (Cornwall et al., 1996). Other notable 
studies investigated imaginal exposure in dental phobia but failed to meet inclusion 
criteria. Thom et al.’s (2000) study combined imaginal exposure with stress 
management training (Ning & Liddell, 1991), and Mathews and Rezin’s (1977) did not 
diagnose participants.  
 
Effectiveness. Two studies were identified, covering a range of specific phobias 
from fear of flying to fear of wearing clean shirts (Watson & Marks, 1971; Rus-Calafell 
et al., 2013). Watson and Marks’ (1971) study evaluated the short -term effects of 
imaginal flooding in 16 clients with a variety of phobias. During imaginal flooding, the 
therapists read continuous descriptions of phobic situations and their feared 
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consequences, with the aim of eliciting high levels of fear in the clients. Imaginal 
exposure to the clients’ main phobias showed significant improvement on phobic 
anxiety and avoidance (AVS; Watson & Marks, 1971) and phobic attitudes towards the 
feared situations. In addition it was reported that panic attacks and general anxiety 
were significantly improved.  
Rus-Calafell et al.’s (2013) study into fear of flying was the other study 
identified in the literature that evaluated imaginal exposure for specific phobias. Rus -
Calafell et al. (2013) found that hierarchical imaginal exposure was effective in 
improving fear of flying symptoms. ADIS-IV (Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule; 
DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994) ratings also showed significant reductions in fear and 
avoidance, matching Watson and Marks’ (1971) finding that these two dimensions are 
both affected by imaginal exposure.  
Interestingly no studies of imaginal exposure for specific phobias in children 
were identified. Emotive imagery (Cornwall et al., 1996) was identified by this review 
as effective for specific phobias in children. Cornwall et al. (1996) tested this 
intervention on children, aged 7-10 years old, with a clinical diagnosis of darkness 
phobia. Several other studies of emotive imagery in the treatment of darkness phobia in 
children had been identified however were not included in the current review as they 
did not meet criterion 4 (e.g. Lazarus & Abramovitz, 1962; Kellerman, 1980) or 
criterion 5 (e.g. King, Cranstoun, & Josephs, 1989).  
Cornwall et al.’s (1996) emotive imagery intervention involved the therapist 
reading individualised scripts of feared situations, with children instructed to close 
their eyes and concentrate on imagining the scenes, as well as focus on aspects of 
images in multiple sensory modalities. Scripts were read in a hierarchical fashion and 
crucially the children’s favourite superheroes entered the scenes and would typically 
interact with the children in a collaborative and/or educational manner (King et al., 
1989). Homework was also encouraged whereby children were asked to recall the 
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content of the script used in each session at home whenever they became scared of the 
dark. Post-treatment, fear of the dark significantly reduced and continued to improve at 
three month follow-up. A darkness tolerance test indicated that those in the emotive 
imagery condition could withstand significantly more time in darkness post-treatment 
and at follow up than those in the control group.  
 
Proposed mechanisms. It is argued that imaginal exposure may act through 
extinction or habituation. The active mechanism of extinction presumes that  the fear 
response is conditioned to the phobic situation and that exposure blocks avoidance or 
escape, which allows extinction to occur. Alternatively, exposure provokes experiences 
of fear and anxiety and subsequent habituation if maintained for long enough. Watson 
and Marks (1971) indeed state that both mechanisms could be at play.  These proposed 
mechanisms and the parallel findings that both anxiety and avoidance were reduced 
after imaginal exposure highlight the importance of considering both of these  
dimensions in clients while delivering this intervention.  
Cornwall et al. (1996) argues that the mechanism of emotive imagery is 
anxiety-inhibition by positive emotions that are elicited through imagining 
superheroes. They did not specify which positive emotions children felt in their study, 
but argued that these emotions have autonomic effects that are incompatible with 
anxiety (Cornwall et al., 1996; Lazarus & Abramovitz, 1962).  
 
Social anxiety disorder. Hackmann et al. (2000) investigated the 
phenomenology of negative imagery within social anxiety disorder using a semi-
structured interview. Imagery was often recurrent, focused on the self and linked to a 
past memory of an adverse social event, and is thought to be a maintaining factor in 
social anxiety disorder (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
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Effectiveness. Three studies were identified that utilised a direct imagery 
technique in the form of imagery rescripting in the treatment of social anxiety disorder 
in adults (Nilsson et al., 2012; Frets et al., 2014; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015).  
Frets et al. (2014) performed a case series using a three stage imagery 
rescripting protocol (Arntz & Weertman, 1999). They focused on the client 
experiencing the adult in the third stage as being compassionate, soothing and showing 
affection towards them. All clients showed an improvement in social anxiety disorder 
symptoms post-treatment, but results at follow-up were mixed as half maintained gains 
or improved whereas the half deteriorated. The authors did not analyse why some 
clients performed worse at follow-up and indeed no demographic or treatment length 
discrepancies seem to be able to account for this.  
Nilsson et al. (2012) and Reimer and Moscovitch (2015) performed larger scale 
trials of imagery rescripting than Frets et al.’s (2014) case series, but using a single -
session protocol. Reimer and Moscovitch’s (2015) study aimed in part to replicate 
Nilsson et al.’s (2012) study with both performing a three-stage imagery rescripting 
protocol (Arntz & Weertman, 1999).  Nilsson et al. (2012) particularly noted the use of 
compassion in the third stage, whereas Reimer and Moscovitch (2015) instructed 
participants to imagine whatever they felt was needed for the outcome of the event to 
be “more positive or satisfying”. The control group for Nilsson et al. (2012) study was a 
social anxiety disorder self-help reading task while for Reimer and Moscovitch (2015) 
control participants received no intervention.  
 
Symptoms of social anxiety disorder were significantly reduced after one 
imagery rescripting session in both studies compared to control conditions. Both 
studies showed significant reductions in negative emotions and distress associated 
with memory retrieval and interestingly both also showed self-reported changes in 
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aspects of beliefs and meaning associated with social anxiety imagery, despite neither 
study utilising an explicit cognitive restructuring component.  
 
Proposed mechanisms. The authors of these three studies (Frets et al., 2014; 
Nilsson et al., 2012; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015) suggest that the active mechanism of 
imagery rescripting for social anxiety disorder may be related to changes in cognitive 
appraisals related to past memories. They argue that these changes can occur 
incidentally as a result of reliving and rescripting, without the need for explicit 
cognitive restructuring, rather like Wheatley et al.’s (2007) “spontaneous 
restructuring”. 
Given the overlap between the first stage of imagery rescripting and imaginal 
exposure however, it may be that habituation may account for some of the 
improvements in social anxiety disorder symptoms.  
 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD). The Avoidance Model of Worry and 
GAD (Borkovec, 1994) proposes that mental imagery of feared situations can be a 
common experience of those suffering from GAD.  It discusses the role that worry may 
play as a coping strategy in temporarily mitigating the effects of such imagery by 
serving as a method of avoidance, whereby worry as a linguistic activity can inhibit 
imagery.  
 
Effectiveness. One study was identified that utilised a direct-imagery technique 
for the treatment of GAD (Fracalanza et al., 2014). Fracalanza et al. (2014) evaluated an 
imaginal exposure protocol, which has also been called worry exposure, and is often 
included in multicomponent CBT protocols for GAD (Barlow, Rapee, & Brown, 199 2). 
Another noteworthy study (Hoyer et al., 2009) was identified through the reference list 
of Frazalanza et al.’s (2014) article that evaluated worry exposure in the treatment of 
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GAD. This study was not included in the current review, due to failing to meet inclusion 
criterion 3.  
Fracalanza et al. (2014) tested a written variant of imaginal exposure, as 
opposed to the more common verbal method. Participants’ feared hypothetical worst 
case scenarios (WCS) were first elicited and they then wrote continuously for 20 
minutes about their WCS on three consecutive days. This consistent exposure condition 
was contrasted with participants writing about a few different WCSs (varied exposure) 
or a neutral topic of what they would if given a day off work (control condition). Clients 
were specifically asked to write in the first person, in the present tense, and with 
reference to their emotional experience and consequences of their WCS coming true to 
ensure they vividly imagined their WCS while writing and to reduce the  likelihood of 
emotionally distancing themselves from their WCS. Manipulation checks were carried 
out to ensure clients followed the writing instructions and wrote about what they were 
supposed to, but no other checks were put in place to measure whether participants 
imagined their WCS.  
 The results were promising in the consistent exposure condition as GAD and 
worry symptoms were reduced post-treatment. There was a reduction in intolerance of 
uncertainty but no change in self-reported cognitive avoidance. Behavioural avoidance 
was reduced however in a modified behavioural avoidance test (BAT) in which 
participants were asked to imagine their WCS coming true.  
 
Proposed mechanisms. Fracalanza et al. (2014) used specific outcome 
measures to test hypotheses relating to proposed mechanisms. Borkovec’s (1994) 
Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry suggests that abstract thinking in the form of 
worry plays a role in the avoidance of imagery of feared scenarios in the maintenance 
of GAD (Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). Fracalanza et al. (2014) 
administered the CAQ (Gosselin et al., 2002; Sexton & Dugas, 2008) to test whether 
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written imaginal exposure was effective via the reduction of such cognitive avoidance. 
Their findings from the CAQ did not support this hypothesis, however their findings 
from a BAT showed reduced fear and desire to avoid which supports the notion that 
reduced avoidance may be an active ingredient.  
Improvement on the IUS (Bhur & Dugas, 2002) also demonstrated support for 
the role of imaginal exposure in decreasing intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas, Freeston, 
& Ladouceur, 1997). It is hypothesised that intolerance of uncertainty reduced through 
exposure to the hypothetical possibilities of uncertain elements of future WCSs 
(Frazalanza et al., 2014).  
The authors also found some support for EPT (Foa & Kozak, 1986), as they 
found positive correlations between reduction in worry and the use of negative 
emotion words as well as self-reported anxious arousal on the SAM-A (Bradley & Lang, 
1994).  
 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). De Silva (1985) documented four 
independent types of obsessive-compulsive imagery from case studies and the 
literature. Obsessional images are mental images of the intrusive cognition itself and 
compulsive images are images of compulsive behaviour that often serve to alleviate 
anxiety/distress much as motor rituals do. The content of disaster images is the feared 
consequence if rituals are not performed, such as the death of loved ones or natural 
disasters. Disruptive images are images that enter into clients’ minds while carrying 
out compulsive behaviour that subsequently invalidate these rituals. Speckens et al. 
(2007) found that that 81% of clients with severe OCD reported intrusive imagery, and 
76% of these related to compulsive imagery. Cognitive-behavioural models suggest that 
OCD imagery can activate distressing emotions such as shame and fear and associated 
cognitions and avoidance or compulsive behaviours (Speckens et al., 2007).  
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Effectiveness. Two studies were identified that evaluated direct imagery techniques for 
OCD (Foa et al., 1985; Veale et al., 2015). Foa et al. (1985) used imaginal exposure for 
the treatment of OCD, and compared its effectiveness with in vivo exposure. Veale et al. 
(2015) evaluated imagery rescripting.  
Foa et al. (1985) employed a relatively time-intensive imaginal exposure 
protocol (see Table 7) in which exposure scripts were presented in a hierarchical order 
on a daily basis. Clients lay down with their eyes closed and were instructed to imagine 
scenes including obsessional and disaster images that were read out by the therapist. 
Each session was taped with clients instructed to listen again at home for four hours. 
Clients were instructed not to carry out compulsive behaviours or engage in 
compulsive imagery. The in vivo condition was similar, involving in vivo exposure 
during sessions and further homework. Obsessive-compulsive symptomology 
significantly improved post-treatment and at follow-up. Foa et al. (1985) found that 
imaginal exposure and in vivo exposure were equally effective.  
 Veale et al. (2015) used a case series to evaluate a single session of imagery 
rescripting for OCD based on Arntz and Weertman’s (1999) three stage protocol. 
Speckens et al. (2007) found that intrusive images within OCD were associated with 
adverse memories, and as such Veale et al. (2015) focused on rescripting these 
memories rather than the intrusive images themselves. Each client acted as their own 
control, by receiving a control intervention where they discussed the content of their 
associated aversive memory and the encapsulated meaning of this memory, without 
rescripting or restructuring. Then each client received a session of imagery rescripting 
in which Veale et al. (2015) placed more emphasis on restructuring the cont ent of the 
visual memory in order to change its meaning to something less catastrophic, rather 
than invoking a feeling of compassionate or safety in the younger self as has been the 
focus of other imagery rescripting protocols (e.g. Frets et al., 2014).  I magery 
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rescripting was shown to decrease OCD symptoms at post-treatment and at 3-month 
follow-up but not after the control intervention.  
 
Proposed mechanisms. Foa et al. (1985) propose the mechanisms of emotional 
processing and habituation consistent with EPT (Foa & Kozak, 1986) for the treatment 
of intrusive imagery in OCD using imaginal exposure. Veale et al. (2015) suggest 
various mechanisms for their use of imagery rescripting. Similar to EPT, they suggest 
that imagery rescripting may allow emotional processing of past memories to occur, 
reducing the likelihood of them returning in the form of fear or obsessions (Rachman, 
1980; 2001). They also suggest that a cognitive focus may have helped clients to 
develop alternative meanings of adverse memory events and also develop a new 
understanding of their intrusive obsession image “as being emotionally conditioned to 
a past memory that had now lost its context and developed a sense of “nowness” (Veale 
et al., 2015 p. 235), much like in PTSD. This may suggest a spontaneous mechanism that 
shares similarities with meta-cognitive approaches (Wells, 2000).   
 
Direct imagery interventions for eating disorders 
 The role and meaning of imagery in relation to eating disorders has been noted 
in the literature, both in relation to images of the self (Stopa, 2009) and body images 
within the media (Spettigue & Henderson,  2004). Ohanian (2002) theorises that 
utilising mental imagery therapeutically may allow access to “primitive” schemas about 
the self that formed from experiences during developmental stages prior to linguistic 
development.  
 
Effectiveness. Two studies were identified that tested the effectiveness of 
direct imagery techniques for eating disorders. Levinson et al. (2014) evaluated 
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imaginal exposure in an adult client with anorexia nervosa, and Esplen et al. (1998) 
utilised guided imagery in the treatment of bulimia nervosa.  
Exposure therapy has been used as a treatment for anxiety within anorexia 
nervosa, for example with the use of food or images of clients’ bodies in the mirror as 
the feared stimulus (Steinglass et al., 2013). Levinson et al. (2014) extended the use of 
exposure therapy in the treatment of anorexia nervosa to feared situations that could 
not be reproduced in vivo. These fears may be hypothetical, such as being rejected or 
abandoned if they were to put on weight, or hypothetical immediate fatness. Levinson 
et al. (2014) performed an initial test of this hypothesis using a single case study of a 
female client with anorexia nervosa – restricting type. The client had a fear of becoming 
fat and feared that if she gained weight, her marriage would dissolve. She would avoid 
eating and situations related to food in order to manage her anxiety. 12 sessions of 
imaginal exposure were completed and recorded for the client to listen to as 
homework. Post-treatment and at one month follow-up, the client showed decreased 
disordered eating. Improvements were clinically and reliably significant after the 
follow-up period. The client’s weight also increased by 1.72 BMI between pre-
treatment and follow-up.    
Spontaneous and distressing imagery has been documented in individuals with 
bulimia nervosa (Somerville, Cooper, & Hackmann, 2007). Esplen et al.’s (1998) was 
the only study that evaluated an imagery intervention for bulimia nervosa that met 
inclusion criteria. Ohanian’s (2002) case study of imagery rescripting within CBT, and 
Cooper, Todd, and Turner’s (2007) use of cognitive imagery modification are notable 
but the former failed to meet criterion 3 and the latter to meet criterion 4.  
 
 Esplen et al.’s (1998) use of guided imagery encourages the development of 
positive imagery, without necessarily addressing any negative imagery associated with 
a psychological disorder. In their protocol, clients with bulimia nervosa were not 
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required to generate any negative imagery that they may experience, but rather focus 
on generating self-comforting and relaxing images (Esplen & Garfinkel, 1998). Two 
types of guided imagery exercises were used in Esplen et al.’s (1998) study and 
sessions were recorded with clients asked to listen to the tapes as homework noting 
down the imagery experienced and any associated feelings and attached meanings. 
Results showed the effectiveness of guided imagery in reducing eating disorder 
symptomatology and binging and purging frequencies, even after controlling for levels 
of impulse expression. Capacity for soothing also significantly improved in the 
treatment group. 
 
Proposed mechanisms. The authors suggest that the mechanism of change 
may be rooted in behavioural theory, through habituation and reduction of avoidance 
that serves to maintain anxiety through negative reinforcement - the anxiety-avoidance 
cycle (Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010). There was a suggestion that cognitive 
appraisals associated with hypothetical imagery seemed to be unintentionally elicited 
during the development of exposure scripts. It may be that some spontaneous cognitive 
restructuring took place during the imaginal exposure.  
Esplen et al. (1998) draw on object relations theories (Kernberg, 1975; Adler, 
1979) to discuss how binge-eating and vomiting, features of bulimia nervosa, can be 
thought of as impulsive emotional coping strategies that aim to self-soothe in the 
absence of more adaptive strategies (Bruch, 1973; Cross, 1993). As such, guided 
imagery was mooted as a treatment which may help individuals suffering from bulimia 
nervosa to internalise self-soothing experiences and indeed use of a therapist as an 
object to this end (Esplen et al., 1998).  Supporting this, experience of aloneness and 
soothing receptivity in combination predicted most of the variance in binge frequency 
(38%) and soothing was the most explanatory predictor variable for purge frequency 
(23%).  
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Esplen et al. (1998) also discuss potential indirect mechanisms of guided 
imagery, that is, those that may have an effect but are not related to imagery itself. They 
noted that self-soothing could have been influenced by the therapeutic alliance and 
benefit of listening to the therapist’s voice on tape on a daily basis. The authors suggest 
therefore that the active ingredient of self-comforting may have originated from both 
the imagery intervention and a ‘non-specific’ therapeutic alliance effect that can be 
explained using an object relations framework.  
 
Direct imagery interventions for schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic 
disorders  
Morrison et al. (2002) found that 74% of individuals with psychosis 
experienced negative intrusive imagery associated with their psychotic symptoms. Of 
these, 69% experienced the intrusive visual imagery in conjunction with psychotic 
symptoms, for example experiencing visual images as the perceived source of auditory 
hallucinations. Visual images can therefore be thought of as maintaining factors in 
auditory hallucinations and their associated distress, (Morrison et al., 2002).  
 
Effectiveness. One study was identified that tested the effectiveness of direct 
imagery interventions for schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders. This 
was a case series of four participants, evaluating a single session of standalone imagery 
rescripting for individuals who hear voices and were diagnosed with schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder (Ison et al., 2014). Morrison (2004) demonstrated the use of 
imagery within cognitive therapy as a case example however as this did not evaluate a 
standalone direct imagery intervention.  
Ison et al. (2014) used Arntz and Weertman’s (1999) three-stage imagery 
rescripting protocol and participants were given a recording of the session to listen to 
as homework. Clients were given the choice to rescript either an intrusive image or an 
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associated memory if they had one. All four clients rescripted an intrusive image and 
three went on to also rescript the associated memory.  
As a group, there was little change in psychotic symptoms, anxiety, depression 
or stress. While little change was detected on standardised measures, three of the four 
participants reported decreased imagery frequency and decreased negative affect and 
distress associated with images/memories as indexed by SUDS ratings. All clients 
demonstrated an increased perception of control over their images/memories. 
Conviction in the encapsulated beliefs associated with images and memories reduced 
for all clients over time and were maintained throughout follow-up. 
 
Proposed mechanisms. Ison et al. (2014) posited that imagery rescripting 
may be a useful intervention in reducing the distress associated with intrusive imagery 
in psychosis, as well as the distress associated with auditory hallucinations. Their 
suggestion is that rescripting works through tacitly changing appraisals about imagery 
and beliefs.  
 
Discussion 
This review aims to provide an overview and analysis of evaluation studies of 
direct imagery interventions for psychological disorders that are not PTSD or trauma-
related. Seventeen studies were identified that met this review’s inclusion criteria, that 
evaluated four different direct imagery interventions: imaginal exposure, imagery 
rescripting, guided imagery and emotive imagery, applied to a range of different 
depressive, anxiety and psychotic disorders.  
 
Navigating the imagery literature 
It is important to note the intricacies of isolating imagery-based intervention 
studies from the literature. This was due to the use of a variety of terms that refer to 
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imagery and imagery-based interventions such as “visualisation”, “fantasy” and 
“exposure in sensu” but which may not make immediate explicit reference to “imagery”. 
In addition, documentation of the use of therapeutic imagery techniques can often be 
embedded in manuals of multicomponent therapies such as CBT, making it more 
difficult to search for standalone imagery interventions without knowing where to look. 
Indeed the terms “image” and “imagery” are remarkably common words, and a brief 
literature search for these terms often returns studies spanning neuroimaging, art and 
literature, which can also serve to add to the elusiveness of easily understanding the 
current state of imagery-based intervention research. The search terms used in this 
review aim to be as inclusive as possible, with references of included studies examined 
for further relevant references. It should be noted however that the search terms 
chosen in this review were, in themselves, an experiment of sorts in identifying their 
ability to capture most or all of a disparate research topic.  
 
Directions for future research 
Recommendations for future research in relation to direct imagery 
interventions for depressive disorders. A more formal evaluation of imaginal 
exposure as a standalone treatment for intrusive imagery in depression is warranted 
given Kandris and Moulds’ (2008) case study results. It can be argued that imagery 
rescripting procedures subsume imaginal exposure procedures. As such, an 
investigation of imaginal exposure with and without rescripting for depression, as has 
been done for PTSD (Arntz et al. 2007) would be a helpful addition to the literature . 
This would help to further evaluate the efficacy of these interventions as well as 
elucidate treatment mechanisms. The promise of these smaller studies naturally 
highlights the need for more rigorous and larger scale investigations that include 
control groups and random group allocation.  
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Recommendations for future research in relation to direct imagery 
interventions for panic disorder and agoraphobia. Despite trialling the same 
interventions for panic disorder and agoraphobia, the two cited studies found different 
results. Clum et al.’s (1993) was in fact aiming to show the superior effectiveness of 
guided imaginal coping rather than imaginal exposure, which may suggest an effect of 
allegiance bias for their study, or indeed Chambless et al.’s (1982) in the opposing 
direction. These inconsistent results highlight the need for further controlled studies in 
adults that have sufficient sample sizes to clarify treatment efficacy, particularly as 
Clum et al.’s (1993) study had only five clients in the imaginal exposure group. 
Arguably, the collection of studies from the 1970s and 1980s aimed at exploring the 
efficacy of in vivo and imaginal exposure in this area require updating and replicating, 
using more rigorous methodologies that allow for direct comparison between studies. 
 
Recommendations for future research in relation to direct imagery 
interventions for specific phobias. Watson and Marks’ (1971) and Rus-Calafell et al.’s 
(2013) studies demonstrate the effectiveness of imaginal exposure across a variety of 
different phobias in adults. It would be useful to evaluate imaginal exposure in children 
as no studies of this type were identified. With the advent of virtual reality exposure 
(Rus-Calafell et al., 2013), continued research comparing imaginal exposure with in 
vivo as well as virtual reality is warranted.  
Cornwall et al.’s (1996) study provides support for emotive imagery as an 
intervention in darkness phobia for children, however requires further replication with 
the use of an attention-placebo control condition. The procedure used encouraged 
components of in vivo exposure to darkness as part of the homework in the treatment 
group and also as part of the darkness tolerance test. The authors themselves concede 
that the emotive imagery approach used incorporated elements of child-directed 
exposure in addition to emotive imagery (Cornwall et al., 1996). This study has yet to 
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disentangle the effects of exposure from the theorised benefits from the addition of 
emotive imagery. In addition, further identification of which positive emotions were 
elicited to inhibit anxiety would be a helpful next step.  
 
Recommendations for future research in relation to direct imagery interventions 
for social anxiety disorder. As noted by Nilsson et al. (2012) the relative effects of 
habituation and cognitive changes as a result of imagery rescripting have not been 
separated. Further studies of imaginal exposure with and without rescripting for social 
anxiety disorder would be helpful in this regard.  
 Three noteworthy studies that were excluded from the current review 
evaluated imagery rescripting procedures with an explicit verbal cognitive  
restructuring element (Wild et al., 2007; 2008; Lee & Kwon, 2013). These studies 
demonstrate reductions in social anxiety disorder symptoms and distress after imagery 
rescripting, and changes in encapsulated meaning of memory events, much like Nilsson 
et al.’s (2012) and Reimer and Moscovitch’s (2015) studies. Lee and Kwon’s (2013) 
study included a 3 month follow-up, in which they showed belief changes were 
maintained. Nilsson et al.’s (2012) and Reimer and Moscovitch’s (2015) studies of 
imagery rescripting alone, did not include a longer term follow-up period and thus it 
has not been demonstrated thus far that belief change post-imagery rescripting in 
social anxiety disorder can be maintained without explicit verbal cognitive 
restructuring.  
 
Recommendations for future research in relation to direct imagery interventions 
for generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). Fracalanza et al.’s (2014) study shows 
promise but requires further replication, particularly with a longer follow-up period, as 
it is unclear whether any gains made were maintained and thus whether a written 
imaginal exposure variant is cost-effective over the longer term.  
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Further research into the various possible treatment mechanisms should be 
incorporated into future studies, with Fracalanza et al .’s (2014) use of validated 
outcome measures aimed at testing mechanism-specific hypotheses being a good 
strategy.  
An interesting finding that warrants further exploration was that WAQ scores 
improved in the neutral condition too. Analysis of these passages indicated that clients 
tended to write about pleasurable activities to take part in during their hypothetical 
day off or goal-directed activities such as housework. Further investigation into the 
effect of writing about and imagining goal-directed or pleasurable activities on anxiety 
or depression symptoms would be interesting, perhaps understood from a behavioural 
activation framework (Dimidjian, Barrera, Martell, Muñoz, & Lewinsohn, 2011).  
 
Recommendations for future research in relation to direct imagery interventions 
for obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). Veale et al. (2015) demonstrate the 
promise of a single session of standalone imagery rescripting in the treatment of OCD. 
Their case series warrants replication on a larger scale, using a between-participants 
design, to provide further support for treatment efficacy. 
 A notable difference between these two interventions was that Foa et al. (1985) 
focused their intervention on the intrusive imagery itself, whereas Veale et al. (2015) 
rescripted memories associated with images. Their separate, positive results suggest 
that targeting both the imagery itself and associated memories can be effective. It 
would be helpful to further delineate these mechanisms, perhaps by directly comparing 
imagery interventions targeted at images versus memories in OCD.  
 
Recommendations for future research in relation to direct imagery interventions 
for eating disorders. Levinson et al.’s (2014) study demonstrates the possibility that 
imaginal exposure to hypothetical feared situations could be an effective treatment for 
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adults with anorexia nervosa. Larger scale evaluations of this intervention that include 
the use of control groups are required to make more reliable conclusions about the 
efficacy of imaginal exposure for this population.  
As the only included study that utilises an intervention solely directed towards 
positive imagery, further studies in this area are warranted that may build on Esplen et 
al.’s (1998).  
 
Recommendations for future research in relation to direct imagery interventions 
for schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders. Ison et al.’s (2014) 
highlights the possibility of using imagery rescripting in a population of those who hear 
voices as psychotic symptoms, however the small-scale of their study, coupled with 
their failure to find significant overall effects on standardised measures, means that 
empirically-based conclusions about the efficacy of this treatment for this population 
group still remain difficult to make. In addition the recognised heterogenei ty of 
auditory hallucinations and psychotic symptoms within psychotic disorders (Schrader, 
2013; Seaton, Goldstein, & Allen, 2001) render small scale quantitative evaluations 
such as this difficult to interpret, and expose the need for larger scale trials.  It is also 
unclear whether further sessions of imagery rescripting would have yielded better 
results.  
 
Mechanisms  
The wide-reaching search process nevertheless highlights the ubiquity of 
imagery within psychological therapy literature. Interventions have been developed 
that draw on multiple theoretical backgrounds and proposed mechanisms. With the 
exception of guided imagery, all of the direct imagery interventions involved 
addressing existing or related negative imagery in some way. To use Holmes et al. ’s 
(2007) analogy, imaginal exposure, imagery rescripting and emotive imagery all 
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involved examining the painting in some way. Examining mental imagery, in the form 
of imaginal exposure, the reliving phase of imagery rescripting or the first phase of 
emotive imagery may be beneficial in itself, without needing to change the image, or re-
paint the picture. Behavioural and physiological mechanisms are often attributed to 
improvements as a result of exposure to negative imagery, such as habituation (Groves 
and Thompson, 1970), emotion processing through activation of the feature structure 
(Foa and Kozak’s, 1986), and breaking of the anxiety-avoidance negative reinforcement 
cycle (Heimberg et al., 2010). These proposed mechanisms do not require any 
conscious change in appraisal of the image.  
Imagery rescripting and emotive imagery share characteristics in that they 
describe reliving imagery content with the addition of changing it in a positive way, in 
other words, re-painting parts of the picture. There have been various suggested 
mechanisms by which re-painting of imagery is thought to be effective in reducing 
distress. Brewin’s (2006) retrieval competition hypothesis suggests that new positive 
imagery that has been generated becomes more accessible over time in the context of 
cues that elicit imagery, thus directly affecting mood. Cornwall et al. (1996) suggests 
that more positive imagery (produced through emotive imagery) has an effect through 
inducing positive emotions which serve to inhibit anxiety (Wolpe, 1 969). This 
explanation seems to suggest that emotions compete rather than accessibility of 
images.  
The majority of imagery recripting efficacy studies ascribed their findings to 
changes in appraisal and beliefs associated with imagery and memories. These 
relatively recent studies mostly draw on cognitive theories, whereas the older studies 
included in this review tended to cite behavioural mechanisms. Studies that 
incorporated an explicit cognitive restructuring element (e.g. Wild et al., 2007; 2008) 
were not included in this review, nevertheless it is argued that imagery rescripting can 
cause spontaneous belief change (Wheatley et al., 2007; Nilsson et al., 2012). In 
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addition, some protocols used explicitly focused more on the use of compassion rather 
than cognitive restructuring in the third stage of imagery rescripting than others.   
It is interesting to observe the shift in proposed mechanisms of imagery 
techniques over time, from so-called first wave behavioural therapy to second wave 
cognitive therapy and latterly to third wave CBT drawing on compassionate-focused 
approaches (Gilbert, 2009). Esplen et al.’s (1998) use of guided imagery involved 
generating positive and soothing imagery, which they explained as being effective using 
an object relations framework, although can be thought of having some similarities to 
compassionate mind approaches. It is possible that other third wave CBT processes 
also play an active, if indirect, role in the efficacy of direct imagery interventions. Veale 
et al. (2015) hint at the possibility that cognitive changes in relation to past memories 
and images can result in meta-cognitive changes, such that individuals change their 
relationship with their imagery and develop an understanding that the imagery and its 
meaning is of the past rather than the present. This shares similarities with Wells’ 
(2000) meta-cognitive school of thought and thought defusion as part of Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Kelly, 2003).  
The current review highlights that there may be transdiagnostic mechanisms 
that are relevant to imagery interventions across disorders, such as habituation. The 
variety of proposed mechanisms to underpin similar interventions highlights the 
opportunity to further empirically test these mechanisms and their relative 
contributions, either through use of specific outcome measures (as demonstrated by 
Fracalanza et al., 2014) or dismantling/comparison between interventions such as 
imaginal exposure with and without rescripting. Fracalanza et al.’s (2014) was an 
example of a study that used outcome measures designed to explicitly test the 
hypotheses of diagnosis-specific theories, within their study of general anxiety 
disorder. Therefore, some mechanisms may be thought of as more specific to disorders, 
such as reducing intolerance of uncertainty in GAD (Frazalanza et al., 2014) and others 
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more specific to interventions, such as the development of soothing imagery in guided 
imagery (Esplen et al., 1998). The same interventions may have multiple and ind eed 
overlapping mechanisms, which highlights the importance of noting the protocol of the 
imagery intervention used when evaluating research studies. An example of this is the 
inconsistent use of compassionate imagery within imagery rescripting.  
Commonalities and high rates of comorbidity between disorders, particularly 
anxiety disorders and depression, strengthen the argument for a “personalised 
transdiagnostic approach” (Craske, 2012), similar to Brewin et al.’s (2009) suggestion 
of a modular approach to treatment.  
 
Limitations  
 There are several limitations related to the current review to discuss that 
primarily focus on decisions made about inclusion and exclusion criteria for searching 
the literature.  
 Exclusion criteria 3 excluded studies in the search process that may have 
evaluated direct imagery interventions embedded within multi-modal therapy 
protocols. As such, despite wishing to provide a broad overview of available 
interventions, it is likely that some interventions may have been missed by the current 
review. A systematic literature search of such embedded interventions may be more 
difficult to execute if studies of whole therapies do not have keywords relating to 
imagery associated with them. In addition, it may be that inclusion of such studies 
would make it more difficult to make conclusions and recommendations about the 
efficacy and underlying mechanisms of direct imagery interventions separate from the 
effects of other aspects of these treatments.  
Studies using SUDS as their only outcome measure were not included in the 
current review (exclusion criteria 4), due to concerns about their validity and reliability  
(Debell & Jones, 1997; Lohr et al., 1992). A limitation relating to the scope of this review 
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is that SUDS ratings were more likely to be used as the only means of evaluation in 
historically earlier studies, before 1990s and the development of validated measures. In 
addition, these earlier studies were more likely to investigate behavioural methods of 
anxiety reduction (e.g. Foa & Chambless, 1978), which may have the effect of skewing 
the view of the literature. 
 
Conclusions 
This review highlights a wide breadth but shallow depth in studies evaluating 
direct imagery interventions. Several studies have utilised case series or single case 
studies (e.g. Ison et al., 2014; Levinson et al., 2014) in order to demonstrate initial 
feasibility and it is clear that further more rigorous studies are the next step in 
proliferating the evidence-base for imagery-based interventions. Adding to the 
evidence-base would be particularly timely given the promising evaluations 
demonstrating the power of standalone imagery rescripting delivered in only a single 
session in the face of the increasing prevalence of mental health difficulties and cost of 
treatment in the United Kingdom (McCrone, Dhanasiri, Patel, Knapp, Lawton -Smith, 
2008).  
It is hoped that the small-scale feasibility studies included in this review pave 
the way for clinicians reading to have the confidence to use imagery-based 
interventions with their clients and indeed evaluate them to add practice-based studies 
toward the evidence-base for other disorders and client groups.  
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Abstract 
Aims 
Involuntary memories are a frequent occurrence in daily life. Involuntary and intrusive 
memories of negative events are experienced by those suffering from some 
psychological disorders. Attachment style has been suggested as an individual 
difference that can affect the experience of intrusions within posttraumatic stress 
disorder. This study aims to investigate the effect of attachment anxiety and avoidance 
on the experience of involuntary memories in the general population.  
Method 
A modified paired-associated paradigm was used to control factors relating to encoding 
and retrieval of involuntary memories, in adults from the general population. 
Participants viewed scenes of attachment-related distress during encoding and 
involuntary memories were triggered 24-hours later.  
Results 
Attachment anxiety and avoidance influenced the experience of involuntarily recalled 
emotional social stimuli, but not the frequency of recall. Attachment avoidance was 
associated with decreased emotional intensity during recall, consistent with 
attachment-system deactivation, and there was a trend for attachment anxiety being 
associated with increased intensity, consistent with attachment-system activation.  
Conclusions 
Attachment theory was shown to be a promising framework for further understanding 
individual differences in attention and emotion regulation in relation to involuntary 
memory recall. Further research should focus on developing and replicating paradigms 
for investigating the experience of involuntary memories in both general and clinical 
populations.  
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Introduction 
 
Intrusive mental imagery and psychological difficulties 
Mental imagery is the recreation and reproduction of perceptual information 
stored in memory (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). Images can be recalled both 
voluntarily and involuntarily, with studies showing phenomenological and experiential 
differences between these two processes. For example recall of involuntary images has 
been found to be more specific (Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013), more 
often in relation to positive emotion (Berntsen, 1996) and faster (Staugaard & 
Berntsen, 2014) than recall of voluntary images. In clinical practice, involuntary images 
are often labelled as ‘intrusive’ to connote their unwanted and distressing nature. 
Intrusive, involuntary imagery has been widely reported by clients with a 
variety of disorders and been studied in psychopathology literature. Intrusions as 
flashbacks form a key aspect of the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; 
DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), and have also been studied in relation 
to other disorders such as social anxiety disorder (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 
2000), schizophrenia (Aleman, de Haan, & Kahn, 2005) and depression (Birrer, Michael, 
& Munsch, 2007).  
Variability in the experiences of involuntary, intrusive imagery and memories 
by those suffering from these disorders has been documented. For example, estimates 
of the proportion of those suffering from depression that experience distressing, 
involuntary memories vary between 44% (Patel et al., 2007) and 87% (Brewin, Hunter, 
Carroll, & Tata, 1996). It is currently unclear which risk factors predispose individuals 
to experience intrusive imagery and visual memories within psychological disorders. It 
is also unclear why some individuals go on to experience PTSD, the disorder most 
defined and characterised by intrusive imagery, after a traumatic emotional experience, 
whereas others do not. Prevalence rates of probable PTSD after experiencing trauma 
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have been found to be up to 39% after a few months (Blanchard et al., 1996). Haagsma 
et al. (2012) found that female gender and suffering from a co-morbid medical 
condition such as diabetes or cancer were strong predictors of probable PTSD one year 
after trauma. Mikulincer, Shaver, and Horesh (2006, p. 83) present the hypothesis that 
attachment-system functioning may play a key moderating role between traumatic 
experiences and PTSD, such that attachment insecurity ‘can prevent restoration of 
emotional equanimity’ and places individuals at greater risk of developing PTSD. 
Studies supporting this have shown the relationship between attachment style and 
PTSD symptom intensity such as Dieperink, Leskela, Thuras, and Engdahl’s (2001) 
exploration of American prisoner of war veterans. 
 
Attachment theory and emotion regulation in response to trauma  
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982) is a well-known conceptual 
framework for understanding and formulating aspects of interpersonal and emotional 
functioning of both general and clinical populations. Attachment theory places 
emphasis on individual differences in internal representations of self and others, 
contributing towards individual differences in affect regulation and resilience in 
response to threat (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973; Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg, 2003). 
Bowlby (1973) drew an initial broad distinction between individuals who are securely 
attached and those who are insecurely attached. Secure attachment is thought to be the 
result of having had an available caregiver to act as an attachment figure in times of 
need while growing up and consequently developing positive representations of one’s 
self and others. Attachment insecurity is characterised by often unreliable support from 
caregivers leading to failures in relieving the child’s distress appropriately, leading to 
negative representations of self and others and a reduced ability to self-regulate when 
in distress later in life throughout adulthood.  
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Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, and Wall (1978) identified three original categorical 
attachment styles based on their observations of infants and caregivers in the Strange 
Situation paradigm: secure, insecure-ambivalent (anxious) and insecure-avoidant. 
Brennan, Clark and Shaver (1998) discussed a dimensional view of attachment for 
adults, through factor analysis of existing self-report attachment measures and 
proposed two independent dimensions of attachment, attachment-related anxiety and 
avoidance. Attachment anxiety relates to an individual’s worry that attachment figures 
will be unavailable (attachment system activation) and attachment avoidance relates to 
an individual’s desire for emotional distance as a result of low confidence in their 
attachment figures’ availability and support (attachment system deactivation).  
Attachment theory has been used to inform development of theories about 
affect regulation in children (Bowlby, 1969/1982; Ainsworth et al., 1978) and 
subsequently in adults (Mikulincer et al., 2003), such that insecure modes of 
attachment are generally thought of as maladaptive (Mikulincer et al., 2006). 
Theoretically attachment insecurity has been linked with maladjustment and emotional 
difficulties later in life and is more prevalent in a variety of clinical populations 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) such as those with depression (Catanzaro & Wei, 2010), 
anxiety (Bosmans, Braet, & Van Vlierberghe, 2010), PTSD (Ein-Dor, Doron, Solomon, 
Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2010) and obsessive compulsive disorder (Doron, Moulding, 
Kyrios, Nedeljkovic, & Mikulincer, 2009). While attachment insecurity alone is not 
thought to be a sufficient factor in causing psychopathology, there is a consensus that it 
is very likely to have a role to play in interacting with other risk factors in disorder 
development as well as maintenance.  
The importance of attachment security in emotion regulation in adulthood 
(Mikulincer et al., 2003) has provoked interest into what role attachment style might 
play in individuals’ coping responses and emotion regulation after traumatic emotion al 
experiences. It is at these times that these authors argue emotion regulation 
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mechanisms are crucial. Crucially, Mikulincer et al. (2006) suggest that individuals who 
are anxiously attached may be more likely to develop and exhibit intrusions as part of  
their PTSD symptomology whereas those with an avoidant attachment style are more 
likely to develop posttraumatic avoidance symptoms. Studies to support this link 
between attachment style and posttraumatic intrusion or avoidance symptoms 
(Horowitz, 1982) have been conducted with people from Israel after the 1991 Gulf War 
(Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993) as well as during more recent violence in Israel 
(Miterany, 2004).  
 
Attachment theory, motivated attention and memory retrieval 
Individual differences in motivated attention, dictated by attachment 
orientation, may provide some explanation for the mechanism by which attachment 
orientation influences the development of posttraumatic symptoms after trauma, and 
the frequency and experience of intrusive memories in general. Shaver and 
Mikulincer’s (2002) control systems model of the attachment system posits that 
individuals high on attachment anxiety use hyperactivation strategies in response to 
threat which results in heightened attentional focus on attachm ent figures and 
relationships, hyperactivation of negative thoughts and emotions, and hypervigilance 
and increased likelihood of directed attention toward sources of distress (Mikulincer et 
al., 1993; Kobak & Sceery, 1988).  This model is congruent with st udies that 
demonstrate the influence of attachment styles on perception and/or appraisal of 
social stimuli, particularly those related to social threat. Vrtička, Sander, and 
Vuilleumier (2012) showed that individuals scoring high on attachment anxiety rate d 
negative social images from the IAPS (International Affective Picture System; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) as eliciting more arousal and less control than those high on 
attachment avoidance. In addition, anxiously attached individuals have been shown  to 
exhibit greater amygdala activation in response to threatening and negative social 
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stimuli e.g. angry faces (Vrtička et al., 2008), a region associated with fear processing 
(Phelps & LeDoux, 2005).  
The heightened attentional focus towards, often negative, social stimuli in 
anxiously attached individuals overlaps with Ickes and Simpson’s explanation for their 
Empathic Accuracy Perspective (Ickes & Simpson, 1997; Simpson, Ickes, & Grich, 1999), 
whereby these individuals are more accurate at inferring the thoughts and feelings of 
their attachment figures. Similar to Shaver and Mikulincer’s (2002) theory, the 
Empathic Accuracy model uses attachment theory to understand how those who are 
anxiously attached have an implicit motivation to closely monitor attachment figures in 
order to keep track of their psychological availability and maintain proximity, given the 
inconsistent nature of such availability from primary attachment figures in early 
infancy. In addition, the converse has been suggested for avoidantl y attached 
individuals, that is, they may be less motivated to attend to and gather information in 
relation to attachment figures (Rholes, Simpson, Tran, Martin, & Friedman, 2007), as 
this information is generally inconsistent with their working models (Bowlby, 1980). 
Thus it can be said that attachment orientation influences motivated attention towards 
attachment-relevant information.  
Further evidence for a motivated attention hypothesis comes from studies 
utilising event-related brain potentials (ERP). ERP studies have shown differences in 
late-positive potential (LPP) amplitudes between individuals with anxious or avoidant 
attachment styles in response to emotional social scenes and words (Chavis & Kisley, 
2012; Lathrop, Davis, & Kisley, 2015). The amplitude of the LPP waveform is thought to 
be related to the motivational relevance of stimuli and serve as a measure of motivated 
attention (Schupp et al., 2000). Schupp et al. (2004) use the phrase ‘motivationally 
determined selective attention’ which illustrates the notion that one’s attention can be 
attuned toward stimuli relevant to a priori incentives or strategies. Within an 
attachment framework, these incentives relate to attachment-related goals of security 
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which are determined by proximity or distance, depending on attachment anxiety or 
avoidance respectively. Chavis and Kisley (2012) found that people with anxious 
attachments tended to show greater LPP amplitudes to positive interpersonal images 
depicting closeness and those with avoidant attachments showed greater LPP 
amplitudes to negative interpersonal images.  They suggest that the differences in the 
motivational relevance of social stimuli can account for the observed differences 
between the avoidant and anxious groups.  
The evidence discussed above, in line with Shaver and Mikulincer’s (2002) 
affect-regulation theory of attachment, suggests that motivated attention plays a role in 
managing emotions in the face of attachment-related threat across attachment styles. It 
is this study’s contention that individual differences in attentional focus towards 
attachment-related information may also affect memory encoding of such information, 
and thus affect subsequent memory retrieval, both voluntary and involuntary. 
Increased attentional focus towards attachment-related stimuli, as in those who are 
anxiously attached, should increase encoding strength and thus probability of later 
retrieval.   
 
Models and processes of memory storage and retrieval  
In order to link attachment, attention and memory, it is important to discuss 
models of memory encoding, storage and retrieval. While it is beyond this paper’s remit 
to describe the vast literature and debates therein relating to models of memory 
storage, it is relevant to broadly distinguish between multi-store models of memory 
and those that advocate single stores. The concept of multiple memory stores draw on 
computational models to explain observed memory phenomena, such that different 
storage systems exist, rather like separate computer hard-drives. These different stores 
have different functions and limitations, and the most common storage distinction is 
between short-term and long-term memory stores (Baddeley & Warrington, 1970).  
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Clinical multi-store models have been suggested that attempt to explain the processing 
of voluntary and involuntary memories in the context of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish, & 
Joseph, 1996; Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Brewin 
et al.’s (1996; 2010) dual representation theory of PTSD suggests that involuntary 
memory retrieval is more likely when accessing emotionally stressful, traumatic and 
partially processed material. They suggest that these representations are processed 
and stored separately from non-traumatic material. They argue that traumatic and 
partially processed material or sensation-near representations (S-reps) are the product 
of processing in the dorsal visual stream, insula, and amygdala and contextualised 
representations (C-reps) of processing in the ventral visual stream and medial 
temporal lobe.  
On the other hand, traditional multi-store models have been contested by those 
that advocate single storage. Craik and Lockhart’s (1972) Levels of Processing (LOP) 
framework, that was further developed by Craik and Tulving (1975), suggests that 
multi-store formulations are unsatisfactory and instead proposes that memory 
performance explanations should focus on variations in encoding processes rather than 
separate stores. The most important encoding operation for these authors is the level 
or depth of processing, such that that greater depth of encoding and processing leads to 
greater memory trace persistence and retention. Shallow encoding processes may be 
concerned with mere sensory features such as angles and brightness of light, and 
deeper levels of analysis concerned with semantic and cognitive processing, triggering 
associations with past experiences. Individuals are thus more likely to remember 
events that have some meaning based on prior experience and future goals.  
Berntsen and Rubin (2008) propose a single storage account relevant to 
involuntary memories in the general population which stands in contrast to a dual -
representation model (Brewin et al., 1996). Similar to a LOP argument, they suggest 
voluntary and involuntary memories may be generated from the same underlying 
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structures, but through different retrieval mechanisms (Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014), 
with material that is more highly accessible having an increased probability of being 
recalled involuntarily. They argue it is more parsimonious to assume that voluntary 
and involuntary memory recall are shaped by the same accessibility constraints as have 
been found for autobiographical memory in general. In contrast to the approach of dual 
representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996), this view states that involuntary memories 
are not special to PTSD in some way, but are in fact a “basic mode of remembering” 
(Berntsen, 2010) that operates on the same episode memory system as voluntary 
memory. It is by understanding memory processes in the general population, we can 
understand involuntary and intrusive memories in clinical populations.  
Berntsen et al. (2013) and Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) further detail 
memory encoding and retrieval processes involved in involuntary recall. They argue 
that the conditions of encoding and retrieval are important to understand involuntary 
remembering and can be tested empirically. They highlight the importance of encoding 
specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Conway, 2005) whereby a memory is more 
likely to be voluntarily and involuntarily retrieved if there is information present in the 
environment at retrieval that is similar to the original event. This information acts as a 
reminder or cue, prompting retrieval. In addition they cite the notion of cue overload 
(Watkins & Watkins, 1975) whereby a memory is also more likely to be retrieved if the 
cue is more unique to that memory. Cue overload helps to explain why individuals are 
not constantly bombarded with memories, as there is very often similar information in 
the present situation to situations held in memory. It would be therefore stand to 
reason that cues that are more unique and specific to particular memories increase the 
probability of memory retrieval. For example, if an individual had seen a tall male 
clown with distinct blue hair at a circus, a cue of a blue wig would be more likely to 
trigger involuntary remembering of this event than merely seeing a normally dressed 
tall man with an unremarkable hairstyle.  The notion of cue-item discriminability 
82 
 
(Rubin, 1995) integrates these two principles, and can be thought of how easily a 
particular cue can be isolated from all else in memory.  
In addition to the processes, described above, which operate at retrieval, 
Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) highlight the importance of processes that unfold over 
time, namely consolidation, forgetting and interference. It is recognised that encoding 
of memories takes places over time rather than immediately upon exposure. This 
process of consolidation has been researched in animals (McGaugh, 2004) with the 
suggestion that synaptic changes within the hippocampus and other areas take place 
over time which correlate with memory consolidation and retention. This is in line with 
Wixted’s (2004) consolidation theory of forgetting, whereby events that are associated 
with increased synaptic potentiation of hippocampal neurons have stronger memory 
traces, and are more resistant to forgetting. While consolidation takes place, it is argued 
there is a process of interference, whereby formation of memories can be inhibited by 
either prior memories or exposure to events that take place in the retention interval.  
An understanding of these processes fundamental to human memory and 
learning provides the foundation for experimentally testing hypotheses t hat can be 
extended to clinical phenomena. By controlling for encoding specificity, cue overload, 
cue-item discriminability and accounting for consolidation and forgetting rates, it 
should be possible to test the effect of motivated attention as a function of attachment 
style on involuntary memory retrieval. It is hypothesised that increased attentional 
focus leads to stronger consolidation, and possibly reduced forgetting due to 
interference, and thus increased likelihood of involuntary retrieval.  
 
Studying intrusive mental imagery  
Intrusive imagery is difficult to accurately induce and measure by virtue of its 
fleeting nature. There have been attempts to study it in a variety of different ways. 
Some of the ways of studying involuntary memories thus far have involved post hoc 
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recall through semi-structured interviews (Hackmann et al., 2000; Hackmann, Ehlers, 
Speckens, & Clark, 2004) or through the use of diaries. These retrospective methods 
can be criticised for poor experimental control over retrieval and are more vulnerable 
to reporting biases in individuals related to the conscious and effortful retrieval of 
memories (Berntsen et al., 2013). Indeed it is problematic to ask participants to 
voluntarily recall involuntary memories.  
An interesting experimental technique of using ‘mundane’ distractor tasks has 
been used to elicit involuntary memories within laboratory settings (e.g. Schlagman & 
Kvavilashvili, 2008; Ball, 2007; Brewin & Soni, 2011). These monotonous tasks reliably 
induce mind-wandering and simulate the conditions under which involuntary 
memories might occur in daily life, such as when in the shower or brushing one’s teeth 
(Giambra, 1989; 1995). Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) asked participants to 
detect infrequently presented vertical lines in a stream of horizontal lines, whilst Ball 
(2007) asked participants to make a string of consecutive word associations in the 
CWAT (Continuous Word Association Task). These creative experimental designs have 
allowed researchers to thus manipulate involuntary memory retrieval, unlike post hoc 
methods described above, but have demonstrated little experimental control over the 
properties of encoding (Berntsen et al., 2013).  
Systematically controlling and manipulating the properties of scenes to be 
encoded and later retrieved allows the factors that affect the likelihood of involuntary 
memory retrieval to be tested. Ideally, it would be important to have control over both 
the encoding and retrieval phases of memory, in order to investigate the mechanisms of 
intrusive autobiographical memories as accurately as possible, and delineate the effects 
of the two. This is what Berntsen et al. (2013) sought to do using a paired -associate 
methodology that utilised a distractor task.  
Berntsen et al. (2013) paired visual scenes with sounds that were either unique 
or repeated in an initial encoding phase. Repeated sounds were derived from a 
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category that was presented several times (e.g. various different dog barks) whereas 
unique sounds were from a category that was only presented once from a category (e.g. 
the sound of a chainsaw). These picture-sound pairings in the encoding phase 
replicated ‘events’ in memory, consisting of visual and auditory information. In a 
subsequent retrieval phase, Berntsen et al. (2013) attempted to activate memories of 
these ‘events’, or pairings, by presenting some of this event-related information, or 
cues. In the retrieval phase, sounds from the encoding phase were presented without 
their associated pictures, while participants simultaneously performed a distractor 
task. They found that, during a mundane distractor task performed immediately after 
encoding, participants reported involuntary memories of pictures from the encoding 
phase in response to cues, and also that  more scenes were retrieved in response to 
unique sound cues rather than repeated ones. This was explained by encoding 
specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Conway, 2005) and cue overload (Watkins & 
Watkins, 1975).  
Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) adapted this paradigm to show that negative 
emotion was a factor that increases encoding strength. They found that emotional 
pictures were more frequently retrieved in voluntary and involuntary memory 
conditions, independent of and in addition to the factors relating to the cues described  
above. Interestingly this effect of emotion was only present if the retrieval phase 
occurred after a period of 24 hours of consolidation, that is, 24 hours after the encoding 
phase. It was argued that the effect of emotion, as an encoding factor rather th an 
retrieval factor, required time to develop, in line with expected memory processes. 
Wixted’s (2004) consolidation theory of forgetting was used to explain this, with highly 
emotional events suggested to lead to stronger memory consolidation, through 
increased synaptic potentiation of hippocampal neurons over the 24-hour 
consolidation period. In addition they argued that greater consolidation of emotional 
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memories means that they are in turn more resistant to interference compared to 
neutral ones (Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014).  
As expected, Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) seemed to observe forgetting of 
the auditory aspects of the memory events (pairings) as well as visual aspects, such 
that the effectiveness of cues changed over time. The effect of cuing, whereby unique 
cues were more effective at eliciting involuntary memories, was present with a short 
consolidation period of a few minutes but not present after 24 hours or 7 days. This 
was explained by participants forgetting more unique sound cues and their  
associations over time than repeated cues, such that in fact after 7 days, repeated cues 
were more effective cues (Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014). It was argued that participants 
may have created “schematic representations” of repeated sounds, thus over time , 
making it easier to remember many similar repeated and related cues, than multiple 
different unique cues (Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014, p. 1953). Over time, however, the 
development of such schematic representations of similar sound cues would likely 
affect accuracy of recall, based on cue-item discriminability (Rubin, 1995).  
 
Phenomenology of intrusive imagery 
The subjective, felt characteristics of intrusive imagery of memories have been 
explored in different disorders, such as PTSD (Hackmann et al., 200 4; Reynolds & 
Brewin, 1999), depression (Reynolds & Brewin, 1999) and social anxiety disorder 
(Hackmann et al., 2000). Phenomenological investigations of imagery are usually 
performed using semi-structured interviews, with common dimensions including 
frequency of imagery, vividness, associated emotional distress and any bodily 
reactions/sensations in response to the imagery. In general, across disorders, these 
studies found similarities whereby intrusive imagery is associated with high levels of 
vividness, a range of negative emotions such as sadness, fear, anger, and accompanying 
bodily reactions or sensations such nervousness, sweating and heart rate changes.  
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Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) investigated the characteristics of involuntary 
intrusive memories in the general population using Likert rating scales. Consistent with 
the hypotheses of differential motivated attention between attachment orientations 
and subsequent depth of processing affecting memory recall (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), 
it may be that memories that are more ‘deeply’ processed are associated with greater 
vividness, emotional intensity and bodily reactions upon recall.  
 
Present study 
The links between attachment theory and intrusive imagery symptomology in 
PTSD have been outlined above (Mikulincer et al., 1993). The present study looks to 
build on this by drawing on aspects of autobiographical memory literature (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972; Berntsen & Rubin, 2008) to suggest that attachment orientation may 
have an effect on involuntary memories through differences in motivated attention 
(Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002; Chavis & Kisley, 2012). Further elaborating upon the work 
of Berntsen et al. (2013) and Staugaard and Berntsen (2014), this study will use a 
modified version of their paired-associate paradigm for controlling and eliciting 
involuntary memories in an experimental laboratory setting, to test whether 
attachment orientation is a predicting factor in memory retrieval, in addition to the 
factors of encoding specificity, cue overload and negative emotion that they have found.  
The aims of this study are relevant to the attachment field as well as the memory field 
in relation to the general population as well as clinical populations. The primary aims of 
this study, relating to attachment theory, are to: 
 support the link between motivated attention in attachment and memory 
retrieval; 
 test the hypothesis that anxiously attached individuals may have more 
involuntary memories of attachment-related stimuli than individuals with an 
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avoidant attachment, under laboratory conditions, using Berntsen et al.’s 
(2013) and Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014) paired-associate paradigm; 
 investigate attachment orientation as a predisposing factor in the experience of 
intrusive imagery within the general population and thus in clinical populations 
too, particularly Mikulincer et al.’s (2006) hypothesis that attachment can be a 
moderator between traumatic experiences and PTSD development;  
 
The secondary aims of this study are to: 
 provide a replication of Berntsen et al.’s (2013) and Staugaard and Berntsen’s 
(2014) paired-associate paradigm for eliciting and studying involuntary 
memories; 
 contribute to the debate between single-store models of voluntary and 
involuntary memories, such as Berntsen and Rubin’s (2008) and the dual 
representation model (Brewin et al., 1996; 2010). 
 
Main Hypotheses 
The primary hypotheses relating to the primary aims of this study are: 
1. An interaction effect is predicted such that anxiously attached individuals 
would recall attachment-related distress scenes more frequently than neutral 
scenes due to attachment system hyperactivation, whereas avoidant individuals 
may recall fewer attachment-related distress scenes than neutral scenes due to 
attachment system deactivation.  
2. Individuals high in attachment anxiety may also experience distressing scenes 
as more emotionally intense, vivid and with more bodily reactions than those 
high in attachment avoidance. This is expected given Vrtička et al.’s (2008; 
2012) findings.  
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The secondary hypotheses relating to the secondary aims of this study are: 
3. After a retention interval of 24 hours, it is predicted that there would be a main 
effect of emotion, whereby across attachment types, significantly more scenes 
showing attachment-related distress would be involuntarily recalled compared 
to neutral scenes. This would replicate Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014) main 
effect of emotion.  
4. After a retention interval of 24 hours, it is predicted there would not be a main 
effect of cuing. Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014) finding that the effect of cue 
distinctiveness decreased over the retention interval leads us to predict that 
there would not be a main effect of cuing. These authors argued that the effect 
of cue distinctiveness decreased over time likely reflecting a weakening of the 
association between scenes and their cues due to interference. This would 
replicate Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014) non-effect of cuing after 24 hours.  
5. While a main effect of cuing is not hypothesised for overall memory frequency, 
it is hypothesised that there will be an accuracy effect of cuing, whereby 
increased accuracy is expected for unique cues and decreased accuracy for 
repeated cues. 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
52 adult participants (31 female, mean age 25.60 years, range 18-53 years) took 
part in the study. They participated in exchange for monetary compensation. This 
sample size was calculated using Cohen’s power primer (1992) to provide sufficient 
statistical power. To the author’s knowledge, there was no similar literature that linked 
attachment and controlled inducement of involuntary memories on which to estimate 
an effect size. As a result, a large effect size was estimated based on the large effect ( 2p
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=.25) found in Experiment 3 of Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014)  study. A type 1 error 
rate of .05 and statistical power of .80 were used in addition to a large effect size 
estimate to calculate the sample size for the present study. 
Participants were recruited from the London area via Internet advertisements 
on research participation websites. An exclusion criterion was that individuals were 
not currently receiving help for a DSM-5 diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). This was stated on advertisements and confirmed in person by the 
experimenter before the start of the study. No prospective participants were identified 
and excluded from taking part due to this criterion.  
The participants were of a wide range of ethnicities, with 26 different e thnic 
backgrounds reported, the largest group being Chinese (n=15, 28.80%), followed by 
Welsh/English/Scottish/NI/British (n=7, 13.50%). 34 participants were students 
(65.38%), with 51 (98.08%) educated to at least undergraduate degree level. 100% of 
participants were retained in the 24 hours between encoding and retrieval, with none 
dropping out of the study.  
 
Design 
An adapted version of the paired-associate paradigm used by Berntsen et al. 
(2013) and Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) was developed for this study and used to 
elicit and measure involuntary episodic memories in participants. This is further 
detailed below (see Procedure). 
Attachment (anxiety and avoidance), cuing (repeated vs. unique) and emotion 
(neutral vs. attachment-related distress) were within-subjects independent variables. 
Dependent variables included the number of involuntary memories recalled in total 
and in each condition, along with subjective phenomenological characteristics of 
retrieved memories (emotional intensity, vividness and bodily reactions).   
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Measures 
The 30-item Relationship Scales Questionnaire (RSQ; Griffin & Bartholomew, 
1994; see Appendix III) was administered to participants to gain a self-report measure 
of general attachment, rather than attachment within a specific relationship or domain. 
The RSQ was scored dimensionally, using a measurement model based on Simpson, 
Rholes, and Nelligan’s (1992) anxiety and avoidance dimensions. Using this approach, 
attachment anxiety is assessed by items 11, 18, 21, 23, and 25 and avoidance by items 
10 (reverse scored), 12, 13, 15 (reverse coded), 20, 24, 29, and 30 (reverse scored) 
(Kurdek, 2002; Roisman et al., 2007).  
The RSQ is the most widely used self-report measure of adult attachment 
(Guédeney, Fermanian, & Bifulco, 2010) and was used as a suitable attachment 
measure in this study as it yields scores on attachment anxiety and attachment 
avoidance, constructs that conceptually map onto this study’s hypotheses. Fraley, 
Hefferman, Vicary, and Brumbaugh (2011) noted that there may be ‘differentiation in 
working models’ across different relational contexts/domains, such that individuals 
may differ in their level of attachment security/insecurity depending on the attachment 
figure in question. With this in mind, Chris Fraley recommends use of the RSQ as a 
measure of general or aggregated attachment across domains (personal 
communication, 22 October, 2015). The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George, 
Kaplan, & Main, 1985) is arguably the gold standard of adult attachment measurement 
(Rich, 2005; Goodman, 2010), but is notably time-consuming and impractical to 
administer and score in research of this kind.  Evidence for the construct validity of the 
RSQ has been provided in English (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994) and in other 
languages (e.g. Guédeney et al., 2010, Bäckström & Holmes, 2001). The evidence 
suggests that there is not a significant correlation between the AAI and RSQ (Roisman 
et al., 2007, Creasey & Ladd, 2005), however it is thought that they predict distinct 
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aspects of attachment functioning in relationships (Roisman et al., 2007; Bartholomew, 
1990).    
 Participants also completed the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), a widely validated and reliable self-rating measure for 
anxiety, to ascertain whether state anxiety and depression affected involuntary 
memory retrieval.   
 
Materials  
Thirty-two scenes were taken from the Besançon Affective Picture Set - 
Adolescents (BAPS-Ado; Szymanska et al., 2015). This picture set, specifically 
developed for attachment-related research, includes validated photographs of social 
scenes developed to evoke attachment-related emotions such as distress and comfort. 
Sixteen pictorial scenes were of interpersonal content of a distressing nature, depicting 
themes of sadness, loss and abandonment.  The remaining sixteen scenes were 
affectively neutral, containing people with neutral facial expressions and limited 
interaction.  
The BAPS-Ado picture has, thus far, only been validated in adolescent samples 
(Szymanska et al., 2015). It is expected that the picture set would be rated similarly by 
the adult population. A pilot validation was performed where 10 adults who did not 
take part in the main study rated the valence of all 32 scenes as neutral, positive or 
distressing. There was 95% agreement between these pilot ratings and intended 
valence of the scenes based on Szymanska et al.’s (2015) validation study.  
Sixty-four royalty-free sounds were taken directly from two previous studies by 
Berntsen et al. (2013) and Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) to be used in the encoding 
phase and as filler sounds in the retrieval phase. All sounds were normalised and four 
seconds in length. Left and right monophonic versions of each sound were created from 
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the original sixty-four stereophonic versions. All sounds have previously been rated as 
affectively neutral by a panel of independent judges (Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014).  
Half of the 64 sounds were divided into three sets of sounds that were highly 
similar to one another (birds singing, car engines revving and rainfall). These similar 
sounds were classed as “repeated” as, within their sets, they would sound repeated to 
the participants. The other 32 sounds were dissimilar to each other and thus classed as 
“unique” (e.g. a bell ringing or a person sneezing).  
 
Task Procedure 
Participants were presented with the information sheet, which informed them 
that they would be asked to pay attention to various pictures and hear sounds, and take 
part in a computer-based attention task. Participants were informed that some images 
may be “upsetting or distressing” and reminded that their participation was entirely 
voluntary and they could withdraw their consent to participate at any point. 
Participants were told that the nature of the task was primarily one of attention to 
maintain the validity of the memory task.  
After participants’ gave informed written consent, they completed the HADS 
and RSQ questionnaires. They were then seated in front of a laptop computer with a 
14.1-inch widescreen display set at screen resolution 1366 X 768, with a set of 
headphones with integrated microphone. They then completed the task which 
consisted of an encoding phase, followed by retrieval, recognition and debriefing 
phases 24-hours later, based on Berntsen et al. (2013) and Staugaard and Berntsen’s 
(2014) experimental task design and which is described below. Participants were not 
informed beforehand that there would be a recognition phase of the study. The task 
was programmed using psychophysics presentation software PsychoPy (version 1.83; 
Peirce, 2007).  
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Encoding phase. Participants were shown 32 trials of scenes from the BAPS-Ado 
paired with sounds. On each individual trial (Figure 1), a pictorial scene and a sound 
were presented simultaneously for four seconds. Sounds were presented to both ears 
simultaneously using headphones. Next, participants were asked to indicate on a 5 -
point Likert scale how emotionally intense they thought the picture was, with 1 = Not 
at all intense to 5 = Very intense to ensure that they focused on the image. The same 
scene was then presented on its own and participants were asked to try to remember 
in their minds the sound that it was paired with. The next trial and picture-sound pair 
was then presented.  
 
 
 
 
Encoding was divided into four types of trials depending on the picture-sound 
pairing combined a neutral or distressing with a unique or repeated sound cue. Using a 
nomenclature similar to Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014) for convenience these four 
 
 
4 s 
Emotional 
intensity 
rating 
Remember 
sound paired 
with image 
(Next trial) 
Figure 1  
Encoding Trial Sequence 
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types of trial are named UniCue_NeuScene, UniCue_DisScene, RepCue_NeuScene and 
RepCue_DisScene. Participants were presented with eight trials of each of these four 
types in an unblocked and randomised sequence. In addition, within each trial type the 
picture and sound pairings were randomised so that the same sound was not paired 
with the same picture. This randomisation was performed four times to create four 
different pairing sets. Each participant was presented with one of the four pairing sets. 
The creation of four different sets of randomised picture-sound pairings avoided all 52 
participants viewing the same trial composition, reducing the possible effect of unequal 
relatedness between pictures and sounds affecting recall.  
 
Retrieval phase. Participants returned to complete the retrieval phase 24-hours after 
encoding. Each trial (Figure 2) consisted of a sound being presented to either the left or 
right ear of the participant. They heard each of the 32 sounds from the encoding phase 
presented once to each ear. They also heard 32 unfamiliar filler sounds that they had 
not heard in the encoding phase presented once to each ear. Half of these were 
classified as unique and the other half repeated. Participants thus completed 128 trials 
in the retrieval phase, with sounds being presented in a fixed random order ensuring 
that familiar and unfamiliar sounds were not presented more than three times in 
succession.  
Figure 1 displays the trial sequence. On each trial, a sound was presented with a 
centred fixation cross.  One and half seconds into each sound, a bright star appeared on 
either the left or the right side of the screen. The participants were asked to indicate 
which side of the screen the star was located by pressing “1” for left and “2” for right. 
This non-demanding attention task simulates the conditions under which involuntary 
memories are likely to occur and serves as a cover task to minimise the chance that 
participants would deliberately search for memories of scenes from the encoding 
phase.  
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During the attention task, participants indicated whether they spontaneously 
remembered a scene from the encoding phase. If so, they were told to press “3”, and 
were subsequently invited to briefly verbally describe their memory using the 
microphone. After this they were asked to rate three characteristics of the retrieved 
scene. Five point Likert response scales were used to ascertain the emotional intensity 
(from 1 = Not intense at all to 5 = Very intense) and the vividness of the retrieved scene 
(from 1 = Not vivid at all to 5 = Very vivid) as well as any experience of bodily reactions 
such as increased heart rate or tension (from 1 = Not at all to 5 = Very much). These 
phenomenological characteristics match those used in previous studies exploring of 
involuntary and intrusive memories (Hackmann et al., 2004; Reynolds & Brewin, 1999).  
 
 
 
Recognition phase. After completing the retrieval phase, participants viewed 32 trials 
of each of the 32 encoding scenes, presented alongside a foil. Participants rated which 
 
 
+ 
1.5 s 
Key pressed:  
“3” for 
involuntary 
memory 
 
 
+ 
Describe 
memory 
Characteristics 
questions 
 
 
+ 
(Next trial) 
(Next trial) 
Key pressed: 
“1” for left or  
“2” for right 
Figure 2  
Retrieval Trial Sequence 
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of the two scenes they thought they had seen before and their confidence in their 
decision on a 5 point Likert scale, with 1 = Not at all confident to 5 = Very confident. The 
recognition phase checked that participants looked at all of the scenes during the 
encoding phase rather than potentially ‘looking past’ the scenes, especially those that 
may be distressing. Aspects of the encoding and foil scenes were matched but 
dissimilar enough to expect that participants would accurately and confidently 
recognise the encoding scenes.  
 
Debrief.  After completing the recognition phase, participants were shown 10 scenes 
from the joy/complicity category of the BAPS-Ado in order to induce a positive mood. 
They were then debriefed, compensated for their participation and had the opportunity 
to ask questions and informally feedback their experiences of taking part.  
 
Data preparation 
Images recalled in the retrieval phase were coded as correct, indiscriminate or 
errors, using the same classification system as Staugaard and Berntsen (2014). 
Memories were coded as correct if they were recalled in response to the sound cue with 
which hit they were originally paired in the encoding phase. If participants retrieved a 
scene in response to a sound that was different from the scene that it had been paired 
with during encoding, the memory was coded as indiscriminate. If participa nts 
recorded a memory in response to a filler sound or if the scene described could not be 
readily identified, this was recorded as an error.  
Coding was performed by the first author and a second judge independently 
coded 10% of participants’ memories to ensure reliability. Interrater agreement was 
80%. Cohen’s kappa was used to test interrater reliability, producing a statistically 
significant result and kappa that indicates substantial agreement (k=.633, p<.001; 
Landis & Koch, 1977).  
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Results 
Data cleaning 
The statistics software programme SPSS version 22.0 was used to analyse the 
data. The data were manually checked several times to minimise the chances of 
transcription errors.  
 
Normality of dependent variables at encoding. In order to test the normality of the 
data, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were performed and histograms with normal plots 
drawn of the dependent variables at encoding (rated emotional intensity of scenes in 
each of the four encoding conditions: UniCue_NeuScene, UniCue_DisScene, 
RepCue_NeuScene, RepCue_DisScene). As the Kolmogorov-Smirnov is a liberal test 
when used to test deviation from normality, the significance threshold, alpha, was set at 
0.01. Intensity ratings for three of these conditions were non-significant on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (ps>.02), indicating approximately normal distributions, 
except ratings in the RepCue_NeuScene (D=.20, p<.001). Inspection of the histogram for 
this condition shows a positive skew. It was decided that parametric tests  would be 
used for analysing the encoding dependent variables, despite one variable departing 
from normality, given the general robustness of parametric tests to deviations from 
normality (Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012; Pallant, 2007; Field, 2013).   
 
Normality of dependent variables at retrieval. In order to test the normality of the 
data, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were performed and histograms with normal plots 
drawn of the dependent variables at retrieval (total number of images recalled, number 
of correct and indiscriminate images recalled, number of images recalled per trial type 
(UniCue_NeuScene, UniCue_DisScene, RepCue_NeuScene, RepCue_DisScene), emotional 
intensity, vividness and bodily reactions to neutral and distressing images). The 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were significant for nearly all of these variables (p<.001) 
indicating departures from normality. Ratings of emotional intensity for neutral (D=.14, 
p=.03) and distressing (D=.12, p=.10) images and vividness for distressing images 
(D=.11, p=.18) were those variables that were non-significant and thus normally 
distributed. As a result of these tests and visual inspection of the data distribution in 
histogram form, it was decided that non-parametric tests would be used in the analysis 
of the variables from the retrieval phase.  
 
Normality of independent variables. In order to test the normality of the data, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were performed and histograms with normal plots drawn of 
the independent variables of attachment anxiety and avoidance as measured by the 
RSQ and anxiety and depression over the last week as measured by the HADS. 
Inspection of histogram distributions and non-significant results on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (ps=.20) indicated normally distributed variables and thus p arametric 
tests were performed on these data.  
 
Outliers. Standardised values of variables were created to identify scores that are 3 
standard deviations from the mean or greater (z-scores greater than or equal to 3), in 
other words statistical outliers. Three participants’ scores on dependent variables 
related to numbers of images recalled were greater than 3 standard deviations above 
the sample mean (range: 3.13 - 4.93), and a further three participants’ scores on 
variables related to image characteristics were classified as statistical outliers (SD 
range: 3.28 – 4.11). These values were doubled-checked as valid entries rather than 
errors and it was decided that these scores should remain in the analyses on the basis 
that they seem to represent a genuine variation in the target variable rather than error 
(Freedman, Pisani, & Purves, 2007). In addition, non-parametric tests based on ranked 
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data were used to analyse these dependent retrieval variables, thus eliminating the 
effect of outliers (Field, 2013).  
 
Questionnaire measures. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for the RSQ-anxiety and 
RSQ-avoidance subscales, and HADS-A and HADS-D subscales, as a measure of internal 
consistency. Alpha statistics, along with means and standard deviations for each of the 
subscales are presented in Table 1. Alphas were over 0.8 indicating high internal 
consistency and reliability within scales (Bland & Altman, 1997).  
Table 1 
 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas for RSQ and HADS subscales 
Scale N=52 M SD Cronbach's Alpha 
RSQ-Anxiety 
 
10.83 4.65 0.83 
RSQ-Avoidance  21.17 6.6 0.87 
HADS-A 
 
6.48 4.08 0.82 
HADS-D 3.37 3.45 0.83 
 
Validation of participant attention 
To examine whether participants had paid attention to the scenes in the 
encoding phase and were able to remember them, a recognition task was used. The 
results of this task indicate that participants did pay attention through the encoding 
phase and likely recalled these images in the retrieval phase as the mean accuracy 
(92.73%) and confidence (4.14 out of 5) were high.  
 
Emotional intensity ratings at encoding 
A paired-samples t-test was performed comparing emotional intensity ratings 
at encoding for neutral and distressing scenes. As expected, distressing scenes were 
rated as significantly more intense than neutral ones (M=3.60, SD=.64 vs. M=1.53, 
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SD=.42), t(51)=19.68, p<.001, d=2.73. This result is in accordance with the data 
obtained at the pilot validation stage presented earlier.  
 
Retrieval of involuntary memories (Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5) 
In order to analyse the number of memories recorded in each trial category a 
Friedman test was performed, which indicated no significant differences between the 
four conditions (UniCue_NeuScene, UniCue_DisScene, RepCue_NeuScene, 
RepCue_DisScene), 2(3, N=52)=3.14, p=.37. Descriptive statistics of the frequency of 
retrieved scenes are illustrated in Table 2. This non-significant result thus indicates no 
significant differences by emotion (contrary to Hypothesis 3) or cuing (consistent with 
Hypothesis 4).  
  
Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations and Range for numbers of Retrieved Scenes per condition 
Condition N=52 M SD Min Max 
UniCue_NeuScene 
 
1.33 1.48 0.00 7.00 
UniCue_DisScene 
 
1.27 1.50 0.00 6.00 
RepCue_NeuScene 
 
1.40 2.20 0.00 13.00 
RepCue_DisScene  0.98 1.09 0.00 4.00 
 
A Friedman test was also performed to analyse whether cuing had an effect on 
the frequency of correct vs. indiscriminate scenes. This test was significant, 2(3, 
N=35)=27.52, p<.001 and Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests were performed to further 
investigate where the difference was located. Correct retrievals occurred significantly 
more frequently in response to unique cues, Z=-2.63, p=.009, and repeated cues led to 
significantly more indiscriminate than correct retrievals, Z=-4.66, p<.001. This effect of 
accuracy related to cuing is in the direction expected (Hypothesis 5).  
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Phenomenology of retrieved scenes 
In Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014) original study, only a small number of 
participants retrieved memories in response to repeated cues. As a result, they 
analysed subjective phenomenological characteristics of retrieved scenes in response 
to unique cues only, excluding those in response to repeated cues. In this study, 
participants retrieved equivalent numbers of memories in response to repeated and 
unique cues, as there was no effect of cuing in the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reported 
above. In light of this, analyses of memory characteristics were performed for all 
memories, regardless whether correct or indiscriminate or in response to unique or 
repeated cues.  
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were performed for each of the image 
characteristics with the valence of the scenes as the repeated measure. The means, 
standard deviations, Z-statistics and effect sizes (r) are presented in Table 3. 
Distressing scenes were rated significantly higher than neutral scenes on all 
characteristics: emotional intensity, vividness and bodily reactions.  
Table 3  
Means, Standard Deviations, Z-Statistics and Effect Sizes, r, for the Subjective Phenomenological 
Characteristics of Retrieved Scenes 
Variable 
  Neutral   Distress   Statistics 
N=44 M SD   M SD   Z r 
Emotional intensity 
 
1.55 0.84 
 
3.26 1.18 
 
-5.20** -0.78 
Vividness 
 
2.88 1.09 
 
3.27 1.16 
 
-2.18* -0.33 
Bodily reactions  1.21 0.47  1.87 1.04  -3.69** -0.56 
Note. * p<.05. ** p<.01 
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Attachment and retrieval of involuntary memories (Hypotheses 1) 
As the dependent variable is count data, rather than continuous data, a  Poisson 
regression analysis was performed to predict the number of emotionally distressing 
scenes retrieved based on RSQ attachment anxiety and avoidance, independent 
predictor variables (Hypothesis 1). Neither attachment anxiety nor avoidance 
significantly predicted the retrieval frequency of emotionally distressing scenes, 
contrary to Hypothesis 1 (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
Summary of Poisson Regression Analysis for Retrieval Frequency of Distressing Scenes 
Variable B SE B Exp(B) Χ2 Sig. (p) 
Intercept .57 .32 1.78 3.13 .08 
RSQ Anxiety .00 .02 1.00 0.07 .52 
RSQ Avoidance .02 .02 1.02 0.41 .79 
 
 
Attachment and phenomenology of involuntary memories (Hypotheses 2) 
Stepwise multiple regression analyses using a backward variable entry method 
were performed to investigate whether state anxiety and attachment anxiety and 
avoidance could predict the subjective characteristics of involuntary memories of 
scenes depicting attachment-related distress (Hypothesis 2). A backward method is 
preferable to a forward method, as it reduces the chances of making a Type II error due 
to suppressor effects (Field, 2013). RSQ anxiety and avoidance scores and HADS-A and 
HADS-D scores were entered as independent variables with emotional intensity, 
vividness and bodily sensation ratings of distressing scenes as the dependent variables. 
Subjective vividness of and bodily reactions to distressing scenes were not found to be 
significantly predicted by any of the three independent variables, such that the 
stepwise regression analyses removed all variables in turn as they did not make 
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statistically significant contributions to the models‘ fit (ps>.13).  The regression 
analysis showed a non-significant trend for a predictive model of attachment anxiety 
and attachment avoidance for the emotional intensity of distressing scenes, (Model 2), 
F(2, 41)=2.58, p=.09, R2=.11. HADS-Depression and HADS-Anxiety were successively 
removed from the first two models due their non-significant contribution. Table 5 
illustrates the regression analyses for the three models.  
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Table 5 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Emotional Intensity of Distressing Scenes  
Variable 
Model 1 
 
Model 2   Model 3 
B SE B β t 
Sig. 
(p) 
 
B SE B β t Sig. (p)   B SE B β t Sig. (p) 
Constant 3.84 .60  6.37 .00 
 
3.81 .57 
 
6.67 .00 
 
3.80 .57 
 
6.64 .00 
RSQ Anxiety 0.09 .05 .35 1.94 .06 
 
0.09 .05 .35 1.94 .06 
 
0.08 .05 .33 1.80 .08 
RSQ Avoidance -0.06 .04 -.32 -1.59 .12 
 
-0.05 .03 -.31 -1.61 .12 
 
-0.07 .03 -.39 -2.17 .04 
HADS-Anxiety -0.06 .06 -.21 -1.00 .033 
 
-0.06 .05 -.19 -1.09 .28             
HADS-Depression 0.01 .07 .03 0.17 0.87 
 
           
 Note. R2=.14 for Model 1, ΔR2=-.00 for Model 2,  ΔR2=-.03 for Model 3 
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Despite the non-significance of the overall model incorporating attachment 
anxiety and avoidance, Table 5 shows the significant predictive factor of attachment 
avoidance in the felt intensity of distressing images, in the direction expected 
(Hypothesis 2), β = -.39, t(43) = -2.17, p=.04. The negative coefficients indicate that as 
avoidance increases, emotional intensity ratings decrease. There is a non-significant 
trend in the expected direction for attachment anxiety too, such that increased 
attachment anxiety is associated with increased felt emotional intensity of scenes of 
attachment-related distress. β = .33, t(43) = 1.80, p=.08. In addition, variance inflation 
factors (VIF), a measure of collinearity between independent variables, were all below 
1.74, indicating that multi-collinearity is not an issue in this regression analysis as 
Myers (1990) suggests that a VIF of below 10 is acceptable.  
 
Discussion 
The results show some effect of attachment on the characteristics of 
involuntarily recalled distressing social scenes. Some hypotheses were not supported 
based on the results found, particularly in relation to frequency of recall. Each of the 
results will be discussed in turn.  
 
The effect of emotion on frequency of involuntary memory recall  
There was a failure to replicate Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014) main effect of 
emotion whereby it was expected that scenes of negative emotional content would be 
involuntarily recalled more frequently than neutral scenes, after a consolidation period 
of 24 hours (Hypothesis 3).  
In attempting to explain a non-replication of the main effect of emotion result, it 
is important to consider whether any differences between Staugaard and Berntsen’s 
(2014) and the present study may impacted the results. It is notable that in this study, 
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participants, on average, retrieved fewer scenes overall compared to Staugaard and 
Berntsen’s (2014), and with a smaller proportion of these classified as correct.  
The BAPS-Ado was used in this study, compared to the IAPS (Lang et al., 2008) 
in the original.  The BAPS-Ado was chosen for use this in study as it has been 
specifically developed and validated for attachment-related research, with the aim of 
activating participants’ attachment systems, where the IAPS is a more generic affective 
picture set. The IAPS has been validated amongst adult samples, in contrast to the 
BAPS-Ado which is yet to have results of adult validation published. It is possible that 
the BAPS-Ado was less valid with an adult sample with regard to soliciting the intended 
emotions, however the results of the modest pilot validation of these images as part of 
this study, and emotional intensity ratings obtained from the encoding phase would 
suggest that this would not have had a large effect on the overall results.  
Another, perhaps more significant, difference between the two picture sets may 
be the similarity of the scenes themselves. There appeared to be a high degree of 
similarity, and thus lower discriminability, within each BAPS-Ado picture type (neutral 
or attachment-related distress), for example 11 out of the 16 (68.75%) neutral images 
used at encoding were of individuals within public transport settings, and 11 of the 16 
distressing images were of children in distress. This may have served to increase the 
‘difficulty’ of the retrieval task, through  reduced cue-item discriminability. Arguably 
this would be more likely to account for low overall retrieval rates and a low 
proportion of correct compared to indiscriminate memories recalled, rather than the 
lack of a main effect of emotion, however the chances of finding this main effect would 
have been reduced as the overall number of scenes retrieved was lower.  
Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) asked participants to rate the relatedness 
between the pictures and sounds in their pairings at encoding, using th ese data to 
ensure equal relatedness across trial types. More related pictures and sounds may 
meaningfully or commonly co-occur, for example a scene of a forest may be rated as 
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more related to bird song than the sound of a train. Relatedness was not controlled for 
this in this study, and thus may have been a confounding factor. Indeed some 
participants mentioned informally that they felt pairings with higher perceived 
relatedness between the scene and accompanying sound were more prominent. As a 
limitation in this study, it is important that replications of this paradigm include 
methods for controlling relatedness.  
To the author’s knowledge, Berntsen et al.’s (2013) and Staugaard and 
Berntsen’s (2014) paradigm is the first to allow experimental control over  both the 
encoding and retrieval processes theoretically involved in involuntary memory 
retrieval, but future replications would be required to further demonstrate the validity 
and reliability of this method.  
 
The effect of cuing on involuntary memory recall 
Staugaard and Berntsen (2014) found that a main effect of cuing was present if 
the retention interval was only a few minutes. Consistent with their finding and with 
our predictions, no main effect of cuing was found after 24 hours (Hypothesis 4). They 
argued that the effect of time may be due to a weakening of the association between the 
scene and its sound cue over time due to interference (Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014). It 
is possible that participants forgot many of the various unique cues whereas they may 
have inadvertently strategically grouped the similar repeated sounds together, and 
thus only remembered “birds singing” or “cars driving”. Unique cues may thus have 
become relatively less effective than repeated cues over 24 hours, as the repeated cue s 
may have been more protected from decay through interference via this strategic 
cognitive grouping. As a result after 24 hours, there was no significant difference 
between the numbers of retrieved scenes depending on the distinctiveness of the cue. 
Further support for this hypothesis comes from Staugaard and Berntsen’s (2014) 
finding that after a retention interval of seven days, the effectiveness of unique cues 
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declined further, while repeated cues remained approximately as effective as after a 
few minutes and 24 hours. 
Given this explanation involving strategic cognitive grouping, or what 
Staugaard and Berntsen (2014, p. 1953) suggested was a development of a “schematic 
representation of …subjectively similar sounds”, it was expected that repeated cues 
may be more likely to lead to indiscriminate memories than correct ones, as 
participants held less specific and more general representations of repeated cues 
(Hypothesis 5). This was supported by the data as it was found that retrievals in 
response to repeated cues were more often classified as indiscriminate than correct. In 
addition, unique cues more successful than repeated cues at eliciting correct retrievals. 
This finding may help to explain clinical anecdotes of involuntary memories in 
response to vague or otherwise general cues, which may share more semantic than 
structural associations with the original memory event.  
 
The effect of attachment orientation on characteristics of involuntary memory 
recall 
The hypothesis that links individual’s attachment style with their emotional 
experience of social stimuli (Hypothesis 2) was partially supported by the results of 
this study. Consistent with studies by Vrtička et al. (2008; 2012), attachment avoidance 
was associated with reduced felt emotional intensity of scenes of attachment-related 
distressed and there was a trend for an association between attachment anxiety and 
increased emotional intensity. These findings support the notion of hyperactivating and 
deactivating emotional regulation strategies of attachment anxious and avoidant 
individuals (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002)  
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The effect of attachment orientation on frequency of involuntary memory recall 
Despite some effect of attachment orientation on the felt emotional intensity of 
scenes of attachment-related distress, there was no effect on recall frequency. 
Attachment anxiety or avoidance was not associated with any differences in recall 
frequency of recalled scenes, as was expected to be the case (Hypothesis 1). This lack of 
an effect may be due to the failure to find an overall effect of emotion or low overall 
memory retrieval and thus be an artefact of this replication of the paradigm rather than 
related to the hypothesis itself or specific testing of it.  However, this study contained 
several potential limitations in the testing of this hypothesis.  
The RSQ is a continuous attachment measure that relies on explicit appraisal of 
relationship behaviour, in contrast to other dimensional attachment measures su ch as 
the AAI (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985) which rely more on implicit processes 
(Jacobvitz, Curran, & Moller, 2002). As such, there may be a greater potential for a bias 
towards social desirability in participants’ RSQ responses. The study took place in  a 
culturally Western location and institution, where individualism is the norm over 
collectivism. Indeed individualism/collectivism has been suggested as a moderator 
between culture and attachment (Agishtein & Brumbaugh, 2013). Participants may 
have generally responded to items in a manner deemed desirable in the prevailing 
individualistic culture, where personal independence, self-reliance and autonomy are 
more highly regarded than cohesion and potentially a greater level of dependence on 
relevant others. As a result, there may have been a bias against overtly identifying with 
statements such as “I worry about being alone” and “I want to merge completely with 
another person” and bias towards being seen to endorse statements such as “It is very 
important to me to feel self-sufficient”, which are all items from the RSQ. Conversely 
there may also have been a desirability bias in the other direction, with the overall 
consequence being that more extreme values of attachment anxiety and avoidance may 
have been censored by participants. The measurement error introduced by a social 
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desirability bias may have impacted on the results found, however may be difficult to 
avoid.  
Whilst attachment anxiety and avoidance are independent dimensions 
(Brennan et al., 1998), they may both exert separate and opposing influences on 
motivated attention and subsequent memory encoding and retrieval, as hypothesised 
in this study. The effects of attachment anxiety and avoidance on memory retrieval 
were tested using a Poisson regression model, however it is possible that the effects of 
one dimension may have counteracted the effects of the other. This cancelling out effect 
would have particularly affected the number of scenes retrieved by participants who 
scored equivalently on RSQ anxiety and avoidance. Participants were not selected for 
participation on the basis of their attachment orientations, however this may have been 
a method of reducing this confound. Initial screening of individuals to create two 
groups of those who demonstrate high attachment anxiety/low avoidance and low 
anxiety/high avoidance facilitates the comparison of the effects of anxiety and 
avoidance more independently of each other.  
The present study’s hypotheses linking attachment and involuntary memory 
retrieval were not supported given the data, however it is unclear why not. It may be 
that there is indeed no effect to be found or it may be that limitations related to this 
study’s method, such as attachment measurement and in the execution of the paired -
associated paradigm, impaired this study’s ability to find an effect. As such, it would be 
worth continuing to investigate the two, either through replications of this experiment 
or others.  
Experiments like the present study that investigate mechanisms of involuntary 
memory retrieval within the general population may also help to elucidate distressing 
memory-related phenomena within clinical populations such as PTSD or depression. 
The following paragraphs discuss the similarities between experiences of memory 
retrieval between healthy individuals and those suffering from psychological disorders, 
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despite differences in terminology used to describe such experiences. Subsequently, 
future directions for research in this area along with some potential issues and 
limitations to be aware of are discussed.  
 
Terminology  
The confluence of clinical (e.g. Brewin et al., 1996) and memory-focused 
cognitive research (e.g. Berntsen, 2001) has highlighted a discussion about the use of 
different terminology used. Kvavilashvili (2014) comments that “involuntary 
autobiographical memories”, “intrusive memories” and “flashbacks” are often used 
interchangeably but in her opinion have key differences. She argues that involuntary 
autobiographical memories are predominantly unremarkable, one-off memories that 
she characterises as “mind-pops” (Kvavilashvili, 2014). She describes intrusive 
memories as repetitive, distressing and disruptive involuntary memories that are often 
accompanied by behaviours aimed at avoidance. Flashbacks are conceptualised as 
overwhelming re-experiencing of traumatic events that is associated with a sense of 
“nowness” and immediate fear and startle. Brewin et al. (1996) made a similar 
distinction, between intrusive memories and flashbacks, with flashbacks being a 
qualitatively different phenomena from any form of involuntary autobiographical 
memories. Kvavilashvili (2014) makes the crucial point that these terms should be 
clearly defined with the aid of fMRI and lesion studies.  
This study comes from the viewpoint held by cognitive researchers (e.g. 
Berntsen, 2001), which suggests that “involuntary autobiographical memories”, 
“intrusive memories” and “flashbacks” are likely on a spectrum. This stance argues that 
despite variations in frequency, emotional intensity and interference with daily life, the 
differences between these three types of phenomena are quantitative rather than 
qualitative, and thus open to study using models derived from the general 
autobiographical memory literature.  
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Studying involuntary memory phenomena in clinical populations 
Involuntary memory research that bridges clinically relevant literature with 
general memory literature is an exciting area. There are a number of recently 
developed experimental involuntary memory tasks which can develop this interest 
such as the task used in this study. Investigating intrusive images and memories using 
these approaches allows greater experimental control over memory characteristics, 
and allows us to test expectations from a range of hypotheses spanning both 
autobiographical memory and clinical psychology literature. This work is in its infancy 
and can potentially be developed to further empirically explore the viability of a 
competing and arguably more parsimonious “single representation” model of 
involuntary memories, in comparison to the dominant dual representation theory.  
Brewin (2014) argues the distinction between single and dual representation 
theories is not necessarily clear-cut and that it may be more helpful to conceptualise 
how ordinary memory mechanisms operate under different circumstances. This is a 
further argument for the promotion of experiments based on general memory 
mechanisms aimed towards testing clinically-related hypotheses.  
It is useful to note some of the limitations of these experimental psychology 
approaches that future research would do well to overcome or minimise. Increased 
experimental control is often coupled with reduced ecological validity, in this case in 
the form of tasks lacking personal relevance for participants. In the current study, while 
images of attachment related distress retrieved were rated as emotionally intense and 
reflected participants’ actual experience (of the encoding phase), they were not 
relevant to participants’ belief systems, cultures, prior experiences, values and goals. 
Incorporating participants’ loved ones/attachment figures as meaningful stimuli would 
be one way to investigate the effect of attachment on involuntary memories, by 
increasing the likelihood of activating participants’ attachment systems and related 
cognitive and behavioural processes that follow. In addition it has been argued that 
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stimuli lacking personal meaning are unlikely to provoke dissociative experiences 
which are a common response in PTSD (Brewin, 2014). The inability and ethical issues 
related to provoking traumatic dissociative experiences in experiments may not 
preclude the application of these types of experiments to other disorders too in which 
involuntary memories and images without dissociation have been reported , such as 
social phobia (Hackmann et al., 2000) and depression (Birrer et al., 2007) and body 
dysmorphic disorder (Veale & Neziroglu, 2010). With this in mind, future research 
should incorporate personally relevant material as far as is practicable in order to 
make assertions about clinical phenomena.  
 
Clinical implications 
Distractor tasks, mimicking the mundane conditions under which involuntary 
memories occur in daily life have been cleverly utilised in experimental tasks. These 
tasks highlight the use of distraction as a possible helpful avenue for introducing people 
to mental imagery construction, who may have a tendency to avoid generating imagery 
voluntarily due to their associated distress. This in turn may help with the application 
of imagery interventions such as imaginal exposure and imagery rescripting (Arntz, 
Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007).  
This research supports the notion that differences in attachment orientation 
may be able to explain some of the variance in symptomatology of different disorders. 
For example it is estimated that between 44% (Patel et al., 2007) and 87% (Brewin, et 
al., 1996) of those suffering from depression experience distressing, involuntary 
memories. With this in mind, attachment experiences and emotional regulation 
strategies may also be useful additions to clinical formulations of disorders where 
intrusive imagery is a maintaining factor.  
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Conclusions 
The effects of attachment orientation on the emotional experience of 
involuntary visual memories of images of attachment-related distress have been 
demonstrated in this study. High attachment-related avoidance is associated with 
experiencing attachment-related scenes as less emotional, consistent with accounts of 
attachment system deactivation. Attachment-related anxiety, on the other hand, trends 
towards increased felt emotional intensity of such scenes, consistent with attachment 
system hyperactivation. Using Berntsen et al. (2013) and Staugaard and Berntsen’s 
(2014) paired-associated paradigm, these differences did not translate to differences in 
the frequency of involuntary memories recalled. Limitations in the experimental design 
may account for this, and thus further study using both this paradigm and others to test 
this hypothesis is warranted.  
More broadly, much could be gained from investigating involuntary memories 
in clinical populations from the point of view of general memory mechanisms. 
Investigating the influence of individual differences, such as attachment orientation, on 
memory recall is recommended using controlled experiments. Such research could 
further elucidate the interplay between individual factors and situational and 
environmental factors that contribute to involuntary memory activation, distress and 
clinical disorder maintenance.  
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Introduction 
This critical appraisal contains some of my reflections upon the process of 
conducting the first two parts of this thesis. In addition, my experience of this research 
process will be contrasted to my clinical experiences, with this conflict being central t o 
discussion of the broader context of clinical psychology research, training and 
healthcare provision. It is hoped that, rather than solely extending critiques of 
experimental design and statistical analyses of the first two parts, a critical discussion 
of this type can provide an additional perspective for the reader.  
 
Reflections on Part 1: Literature Review 
 
Finding a literature review topic. In considering a starting point for the literature 
review, my aim was to select a topic that addressed a clinically-meaningful gap in the 
literature. The final review collates direct imagery interventions which may be used as 
a ‘reference manual’ for therapists and was partly borne out of my own sense of 
uncertainty in navigating the imagery literature. My experience was shared by other 
clinicians, as confirmed by Bell et al.’s (2015) interpretative phenomenological analysis 
of therapists’ experiences of clinical imagery interventions. This was the second review 
topic I had researched the feasibility of, the first being related to cross-cultural 
attachment. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982) has been prominent in my 
psychodynamically-oriented clinical thinking and formulation, and I was interested in 
finding out more about critical and social constructionist approaches towards it; indeed 
writing a review on a topic is a good way of learning more about it.  
My initial scoping searches unveiled several difficulties in beginning to 
conceptualise a critical review question in relation to cross-cultural stances on 
attachment theory. Despite attachment theory being so well-known and popular within 
the field, there seemed to be a relative paucity of literature on cross-cultural influences 
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on our understanding of adult attachment.  Several studies have employed the Strange 
Situation (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) with mothers and infants from 
different cultural and ethnic backgrounds in order to compare attachment 
classifications inter-culturally (e.g. Bakermans-Kranenberg et al., 2004; Takahashi, 
1990). Van IJzendoorn and Kroonenberg (1988) have written review of these studies. 
Heidi Keller (Keller, 2013; Otto, & Keller, 2014) deconstructs attachment theory, citing 
anthropological research to highlight the argument that Western middle-class values 
that promote the nuclear family unit and autonomy imbue assumptions of attachment 
theory. She asserts that that cross-cultural Strange Situation studies still apply a 
culturally-bound paradigm and attachment classification system to other cultures, 
rather than taking account of and incorporating different culture’s conceptualisations 
of parenting practices into theory and research. Keller (2013) calls for the development 
of a new research strategy of this type. 
My desire to write a literature review detailing this was hindered by this 
strategy not yet being developed. In addition, it may well be that a proliferation of 
attachment “theories” that are adapted to different cultures is unlikely to happen in the 
near future, due to the view that attachment theory draws on aspects of evolutionary 
theory and thus is a stable construct irrespective of culture. Culture-specific research 
also faces the obstacle of the current dominance within published psychological 
thinking and research globally of Western cultural values and the English language. 
This dominance perhaps explains why often studies relating to cross-cultural 
attachment seem to be published in “niche” journals such as the Journal of Cross -
Cultural Psychology. In addition, several articles were written in other languages,  as 
expected, further compounding the difficulty I had in further exploring this area. These 
initial difficulties during the scoping search process suggested that perhaps part of 
attachment theory’s appeal and popularity is its proposed universality, and t he comfort 
gained from a theory that supposedly encapsulates and is applicable to all cultures and 
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families. Indeed in writing to Joseph Hooker, Darwin himself (1857) used the terms 
“lumpers” and “splitters” which may be applicable here, with psychologists  generally 
preferring to lump behaviour across cultures into one over-arching theory.   
 
Diagnosis as an inclusion criterion. My final choice of literature review topic was 
more straightforward to search for and carry out. The inclusion criteria for the 
systematic search required evaluation studies to use samples that were assessed as 
having a diagnosis of a psychological disorder. This inclusion criterion was aimed at 
increasing the validity of conclusions made about interventions’ effectiveness for a 
given population. While this is a common practice in literature reviews of this type, 
several studies were excluded as a result of not meeting this criterion, while satisfying 
all of the other criteria (e.g. Kandris & Moulds, 2008). Attempts were made to highl ight 
relevant excluded studies, however it is unclear how many studies were unknowingly 
excluded in the earlier electronic search procedure.  
I felt some conflict between abiding by diagnostic criteria for the purposes of 
the review, and my clinical practice, in which I tend to eschew diagnostic labelling if 
possible. Indeed this conflict has been highlighted in the British Psychological Society’s 
policy and guidance in relation to diagnosis (BPS, 2013), whereby it is recognised that 
reference to diagnostic terms by psychologists may facilitate communication and 
research, but they recognise the limitations of such systems. It is in keeping with these 
guidelines and my own current position on the use of diagnostic labelling that I use a 
portion of this critical appraisal to note this discordance, as opposed to providing tacit 
acceptance of the general use of diagnostic classification systems.  
 
Standardised outcome measures as an inclusion criterion. A similar conflict arose 
in relation to inclusion criterion 4 which stipulates that studies should include the use 
of standardised quantitative outcome measures. As with the use of diagnostic criteria, a 
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dissociation between my research and clinical practice was evident. The aim and 
measure of therapeutic success in evaluations studies included in the review was 
improvement on questionnaire scores, whereas my notion of outcome has tended to be 
broader as a clinician. It has been my experience that relying on outcome measures 
alone, as research studies often do, can be deceiving, have little meaning and be a 
relatively poor indicator of how a client is functioning in reality.  
For example a client may show improvement on self-rated depression 
measures post-therapy but far from having resolved their presenting problem, may 
now feel angry instead, as a separate mechanism for managing a core pain (Busch, 
2009). The over-reliance on diagnostic categories and associated outcome measures 
can have the effect of over-simplifying our conceptualisation of treatment, such that 
there is a move to treat the depression as indexed by depression scores, for example, 
rather than a focus on helping an individual with a unique set of difficulties. Within 
clinical work outcomes are often more nuanced and meaningful than may be measured 
by questionnaire such as a client being able to attend outpatient appointments on time, 
or be able to cry. While acknowledging the convenience of using standardised 
measures, it is my view that a broader conceptualisation of what constitutes a 
meaningful outcome in therapy interventions pays more respect to the individual 
variability of human suffering, and indeed human triumph over suffering.  
 
Treatment mechanisms. The discussion of active mechanisms of treatment 
interventions as part of my review brought to mind the longstanding debate between 
specific and non-specific treatment effects within psychotherapy literature (e.g. 
DeRubeis, Brotman, & Gibbons, 2005). With the exception of Esplen et al. (19 98), the 
studies included in the review suggested specific effects only. This may have been more 
likely given they evaluated specific imagery interventions rather than whole therapies. 
It was also notable that similar interventions were often ascribed to being effective via 
127 
 
different mechanisms, which may reflect the a priori orientation and research interests 
of the researchers. At least seven separate mechanisms were described to understand 
the four imagery interventions. In addition, within interventions, it appeared that 
minor variations in technique also reflected these interests. Veale et al.’s (2015) study 
of imagery rescripting in OCD, for example, cited behavioural and cognitive changes as 
the likely mechanism of change, which reflects the first and second wave CBT 
orientation of the body of his research work. Interestingly, the protocol used in their 
study seemed to depart from the imagery rescripting protocol (Arntz & Weertman, 
1999) that they utilised, by not including a compassion component, which more reflects 
third wave CBT. While immersed in reading these research papers, I found the 
theoretical arguments for specific effects internally coherent and thus more persuasive. 
However, in writing this critical appraisal, and taking a step back, these  arguments 
seem less persuasive in the face of studies citing other mechanisms, as well as a 
broader view taking account of a multitude of possible non-specific effects. An 
alternative approach to the specific/non-specific hypothesis that I currently advocate is 
that of Butler and Strupp (1986), who argue that the distinction between specific and 
non-specific effects cannot be meaningfully made. They put this extremely well, echoing 
some of my thoughts above in relation to universal cross-cultural theories: 
 
Dividing a complex phenomenon into two conceptually distinct but inclusive 
categories is an intellectual exercise of remarkable popularity in psychology. 
Dichotomies seem to capture our scientific imagination, generating volumes of 
published material. We begin to feel that a previously monstrous complexity 
has receded, yielding to the bright light of our simple, clear understanding. This 
sense of mastery is sometimes justified…unfortunately, there is a scientifically 
dangerous side to such divisions of reality that must always be weighed against 
their utility. (Butler & Strupp, 1986, p. 30) 
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Reflections on Part 2: Empirical Paper  
 
Attachment measures. A significant hurdle to overcome in designing the empirical 
paper came from how to measure participants’ attachment orientations. Within the 
literature, there are two independent theoretical and practical approaches to this. 
Traditionally the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985), 
which involves a detailed discourse analysis and coding of participants’ attachment 
histories, is often regarded as the gold standard adult attachment measure (Barbot, 
Heinz, & Luthar, 2014; McCluskey,  2005). This line of research developed from 
investigations into parenting of young infants in child and developmental psychology. It 
is concerned with adults’ states of mind in relation to attachment, and may have the 
advantages of activating the attachment system and a reduced impact of response bias 
due to defence mechanisms or social desirability. The AAI is costly and inconvenient to 
administer across multiple participants, due to extensive prior training that is required, 
and the several hours to transcribe and code each participant’s interviews.  
The second line of research stems from Hazan and Shaver’s (1987) 
development of a self-report attachment measure, which focused on adult loneliness 
and romantic attachments. Their approach to Bowlby’s attachment theory from a 
personality and social psychology background was an important step in facilitating 
research into adult attachment from an individual differences perspective. Self-
evaluation attachment measures can be easily administered to multiple participants 
and provide accessible attachment scores. These self-report measures require 
individuals to have awareness of feelings and behaviours in close relationships which 
can distort responses (Ravitz, Maunder, Hunter, Sthankiya, Lancee, 2010).  
Bartholomew (1990) reviewed these two traditions within attachment research 
and noted several differences. A key difference between the two approaches was the 
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domains with which they focus on. The former focuses on parent-child relationships 
and the latter on adult romantic relationships. The notion that attachment styles may 
differ depending on the attachment figure has been demonstrated by Fraley, 
Hefferman, Vicary, and Brumbaugh (2011) who use the phrase ‘differentiation in 
working models’ across different relational contexts/domains. With this differentiation 
in mind, general measures of attachment that could be used across domains were 
developed such as the Relationship Scales Questionnaire (RSQ; Griffin & Bartholomew, 
1994) and the Experience in Close Relationships questionnaire (ECR; Brennan, Shaver, 
& Clark, 1998) which can be re-worded based on the relationship or domain in 
question. I was helped through navigating the minefield of attachment -related 
measures by Professor R. Chris Fraley of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 
(personal communication, 22 October, 2015), who recommended the RSQ on the basis 
that it is a convenient self-report measure of general attachment that can be scored in a 
variety of ways, both dimensionally and categorically.  
Despite the nomothetic appeal of the RSQ and other self-report attachment 
measures, issues of response bias were evident in my experience of administering the 
RSQ. The transparency of RSQ items may have explained why some participants 
explicitly professed to me how important their independence was to them, and one 
participant to remark, “I know I’m securely attached  anyway” before completing the 
measure. Some of the issues of the effect of social desirability and culture on 
attachment self-report measurement are further discussed in the empirical paper. 
While the RSQ is a 30-item measure, scoring based on Simpson, Rholes, and Nelligan’s 
(1992) anxiety and avoidance dimensions (Kurdek, 2002; Roisman et al., 2007), utilises 
only 5 items to create the anxiety subscale and 8 for the avoidance subscale. The small 
number of items in each subscale may have also contributed to an increase in the 
overall effects of response biases on anxiety and avoidance scores.  
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Overarching reflections 
My undergraduate degree in Experimental Psychology was a  decidedly 
scientific discipline, classified as a medical science and concerned with the 
development and critique of experimental method to understand human behaviour. A 
computational theory of mind (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) underpins some aspects of an 
experimental psychology approach, such that the human mind can be thought of as an 
information-processing computational system. Within this approach, the mind can be 
loosely thought of as like a Turing machine, and within experimental psychology 
research, individual variation was controlled using large samples and probabilistic 
statistical tests. As a result, during my undergraduate training, people were mostly seen 
as ‘participants’ (formerly ‘subjects’). My subsequent experiences in the field of clinical 
psychology, both pre-training and while on placements as part of training, were mostly 
in the context of a different philosophical framework. People are most often called 
‘clients’, with complex histories, emotions, personalities and relationships.  
Throughout the process of conducting the first two parts of this thesis, a tension 
between viewpoints of how individuals are thought about and conceptualised arose. 
This tension has also arisen during the course of other aspects of my clinical training.  
The culture and practice of utilising diagnostic classification systems, and 
nomothetic self-report measures of symptoms and attachment dimensions may serve 
to represent examples of the oversimplification of human experience that can occur 
when there is an over-reliance on using such quantitative methods. Indeed the 
dominance of quantitative research in published literature has been noted (Gagliardi & 
Dabrow, 2011; Greenhalgh et al. 2016), which may have a reductionist influence on our 
knowledge of human phenomena in clinical psychology, which subsequently has an 
effect on teaching and the development of the field.  
The views of the psychologist and critical humanist Sigmund Koch (Smith, 
2001) resonate with some of my own. His ‘cognitive pathology’ or ‘pathology of inquiry’ 
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approach observes and critiques the tradition of human inquiry, mostly within  the 
sciences and psychology, as well as aspects of the humanities (Koch, 1999). He 
suggested that “meaningful pursuit of the widely varied psychological studies will 
demand of the inquirers in each area rich and specialized sensibilities relevant to the 
particular phenomenological domain at issue” (Koch, 1999, p. 27). On the other  hand, 
he suggested that 20th century psychology in particular was afflicted by “pseudo-
inquiry” and “ameaningful thinking” such that:  
 
knowledge is an almost automatic process of a gimmickry, an assembly line, a 
methodology. It assumes that inquiring action is so rigidly and fully regulated 
by rule that in its conception of inquiry it often allows the rules totally to 
displace their human users. Presuming as it does that knowledge is generated 
by processing, its conception of knowledge is fictionalistic, conventionalistic. So 
strongly does it see knowledge under such aspects that at times it seems to 
suppose the object of inquiry to be an ungainly and annoying irrelevance. 
Detail, structure, quiddity are obliterated. Objects of knowledge become 
caricatured, if not faceless, and thus they lose reality. The world, or any given 
part of it, is not felt fully or passionately and is perceived as devoid of objective 
value. (Koch, 1999, p. 28-29) 
 
Koch critiques the scientistic ambitions of psychology, notably during the 
middle of the 20th century in a time when Skinnerian behaviourism and cognitive 
psychology were foremost. 
It is my contention that, in some respects, we may not have moved on that far 
within clinical psychology from the days of Koch. My experience of conducting this 
thesis has, at times, led me to feel slightly disillusioned with the research process. The 
criticism of reductionism levelled at the use of nomothetic outcome measures and 
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diagnostic labelling has contributed to my sense of researching within a vacuum at 
times, perhaps guilty of ameaningful thinking. The dominance of an all -encompassing 
view of attachment theory may be an example of what Koch termed “single-principle 
imperialism”.  
This pathology of inquiry may be also present throughout other aspects of 
clinical psychology, not just research. Indeed, throughout clinical training, I have felt a 
disconnect at times between the realities of clinical work on placements and the 
knowledge presented through academic teaching. In addition evidence of ameaningful 
reductionism may arguably be seen in the evolving landscape of clinical psychology 
provision within the NHS. The IAPT (Improving Access to Psychological Therapies) 
programme has arguably constrained the choice of available psychological therapies 
(Winter, 2007) to a dominant CBT model (Burkeman, 2016). The championing of CBT 
within IAPT services and commissioning may again be an example of single-principle 
imperialism, whereby there is a tendency to “persist so rigidly, so blindly, patiently in the 
application of the rules – despite fulsome indications of their disunity – that the behaviour 
would have to be characterized as schizophrenic in any other  context” (Koch, 1999, p. 
398). An unfortunate consequence of which is that other forms of therapy cannot be 
allowed to flourish. It has been an interesting exercise to reflect upon how the issues 
raised during the process of conducting this thesis may serve as a microcosm of wider 
perceived issues within the field of clinical psychology as a whole. By situating my 
experiences within different historical and philosophical contexts, it is my view that 
perhaps current clinical psychology is not so far away from seeing people as Turing 
machines as it would be comfortable to assume.  
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